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THE  MISBEGOTTEN  JUDICIAL  RESISTANCE  TO
THE DAUBERT REVOLUTION
David E. Bernstein*
INTRODUCTION
Until approximately thirty years ago, expert witnesses hired by parties to
litigation in the United States could testify almost without limit about any
relevant issue within the scope of their expertise.1  Beginning in the mid-
1980s, federal law rapidly and radically evolved until by 2000 all expert testi-
mony needed to pass a reliability test before it could be deemed admissible.2
Much of this evolution took place in toxic tort cases, in the context of
broader debate about the efficiency and justice of toxic tort litigation.3  Con-
troversy surrounded mass tort litigation involving the morning sickness drug
Bendectin, silicone gel breast implants, and the herbicide Agent Orange,
among other products and substances.4
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1 See infra notes 27–9 and accompanying text. R
2 See infra notes 50–9 and accompanying text.
3 Dozens of treatises and law review articles have been written about toxic tort litiga-
tion and attendant controversies.  For a sampling of books on the subject, see, e.g., CARL F.
CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES (1993) [hereinafter CRANOR, REGULATING]; CARL
F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS (2006) [hereinafter CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS]; KENNETH R. FOSTER &
PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE (1999); KENNETH FOSTER ET AL., PHANTOM RISK: SCIEN-
TIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW (1993); JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995); PETER W.
HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE (1991); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR (1995).
4 For books discussing some of these mass torts and the evidentiary issues they
presented, see MARCIA ANGEL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL (1996); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN
AND BIRTH DEFECTS (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL (1998); PETER H.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986); see generally Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman,
The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 217, 224 (2006) (“It is not a coincidence that Daubert coincided with the
emergence of toxic torts and the burgeoning use of experts in civil litigation.”).
27
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Many courts ultimately determined that much of this litigation relied on
causation theories that were not supported by sound scientific evidence.
This led to judicial rulings restricting the admissibility of expert testimony,
which in turn created sufficient uncertainty and controversy to provoke
Supreme Court intervention.5  In a period of six years, the Supreme Court
issued the so-called Daubert trilogy of opinions—Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 General Electric Co. v. Joiner,7 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Car-
michael8—each of which tightened the standards for the admissibility of
expert testimony.9  In 2000, an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
codified a test that allows experts to testify only when their opinions meet a
stringent reliability test.10
The profound changes to the traditional laissez-faire law of expert testi-
mony provoked resistance from some federal judges who favored more lib-
eral rules of admissibility.  These judges rejected the early precedents
excluding expert testimony from toxic torts cases of the late 1980s,11 applied
Daubert narrowly in the mid-1990s,12 and, in the late 1990s, exploited loop-
holes and ambiguities in Joiner and Kumho Tire to admit questionable expert
testimony.13  All of these actions, while broadly contrary to the trajectory of
expert evidence law, were within the bounds of a reasonable interpretation of
the extant law.
Judicial resistance should have withered away, however, after the 2000
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  The rule provides that expert
testimony that would otherwise be helpful to the jury is admissible only when
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.14
To get a sense of the dramatic shift amended Rule 702 represents, just a
decade before it went into effect no American jurisdiction applied such strict
admissibility criteria.  Most federal courts, recognizing their place in the
scheme of things,15 have acquiesced to the new regime.  There has, however,
5 See infra notes 7–81 and accompanying text.
6 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
8 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
9 See infra notes 82–139 and accompanying text.
10 FED. R. EVID. 702.
11 See infra notes 27–81 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 82–107 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 108–136 and accompanying text. R
14 FED. R. EVID. 702.
15 Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Our
responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court’s opinion, is to resolve
disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their
expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not ‘good
science,’ and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was not ‘derived by the
scientific method.’  Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we
take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task.”).
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been an extraordinary undercurrent of rebellion by a minority of federal
judges who implicitly object to the radical changes16 wrought by the “Daubert
revolution.”  These judges ignore the text of Rule 702, and instead rely on
lenient precedents that predate (and conflict with) not only the text of
amended Rule 702, but also with some or all of the Daubert trilogy.17
The most prominent example of such judicial truculence is the First Cir-
cuit’s 2011 opinion in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc.18  In Mil-
ward, the First Circuit reversed as an abuse of discretion a district court’s
ruling excluding causation evidence in a toxic tort case.19  In doing so, the
appellate court ignored Rule 702, disregarded the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Joiner, relied on obsolete precedents, misunderstood the underlying ratio-
nale for exclusionary rules for expert testimony, misapplied basic scientific
concepts, and credulously endorsed “weight of the evidence” as a valid scien-
tific methodology.20
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ lawyers have greeted Milward with great
enthusiasm, treating the opinion as a jurisprudential Moses that will part the
Rule 702 Sea and lead them to the Promised Land of pre-Daubert admissibil-
ity rules.21  Defense lawyers, meanwhile, have been aghast.22  The Supreme
16 See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 895 (2013) (describing
these changes as “revolutionary”).
17 See infra notes 147–222 and accompanying text.
18 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).  Milward has provoked a great deal of commentary, both
favorable and unfavorable. See, e.g., 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE § 29:6, at 781 (2010-2011 ed. 2010); DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE—EXPERT EVIDENCE § 10.5.1 (Supp. 2012); Steve C. Gold, The
“Reshapement” of the False Negative Asymmetry in Toxic Tort Causation, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1507, 1580 (2011) (suggesting that Milward holds the “promise of reshaping toxic tort
causation law”); Michael D. Green, Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a Crystal
Ball, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 1010 n.53 (2011) (describing Milward as “[o]ne of the
most significant toxic tort causation cases in recent memory”); Carl Cranor, Milward v.
Acuity Specialty Products: How the First Circuit Opened Courthouse Doors for Wronged Parties to
Present Wider Range of Scientific Evidence, CPR BLOG (July 25, 2011), http://www.progressiver-
eform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=616EE094-D602-ED68-85FD84E7EB0A212E; William A.
Ruskin, Daubert on the Defense?, TOXIC TORT LITIG. BLOG (June 6, 2012), http://www.toxic
tortlitigationblog.com/tags/milward-v-acuity-specialty-pro.
19 Milward, 639 F.3d at 26.
20 See infra notes 198–220 and accompanying text.
21 See Steve Baughman Jensen, Reframing the Daubert Issue in Toxic Tort Cases, TRIAL,
Feb. 2013, at 46; Symposium Considers “Weight of the Evidence” Approach, TRIAL, Sept. 2012, at
50.
22 See Eric Lasker, Manning the Daubert Gate: A Defense Primer in Response to Milward v.
Acuity Specialty Products, 79 DEF. COUNS. J. 128, 128 (2012); James F. Rogers, James Shel-
son & Jessalyn H. Zeigler, Changes in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (Third Edi-
tion), 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 287, 293–96 (2013); Barnes & Thornberg LLP, Rejecting Milward: A
“Weight of the Evidence” Methodology Is No Methodology at All, NAT’L L. REV. (July 30, 2012),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/rejecting-milward-weight-evidence-methodology-no-
methodology-all; Julie A. Brennan, Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products: The “Weight of the
Evidence” Necessitates Supreme Court Review of First Circuit’s Decision, DRITODAY (March 8,
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Court refused to review Milward,23 so it remains good law in the First Circuit,
requiring district court judges to admit speculative causation testimony. Mil-
ward also has the potential to influence the law in other circuits and in state
courts.24
This Article reviews the history of the evolution of the rules for the
admissibility of expert testimony since the 1980s, the revolutionary nature of
what ultimately emerged, and the consistent efforts by recalcitrant judges to
stop or roll back the changes, even after Rule 702 was amended to explicitly
incorporate a strict interpretation of those changes.
Part I reviews the law of expert testimony through the Supreme Court’s
Daubert decision.  Critics had charged for decades that the adversarial system
was a failure with regard to expert testimony.  Parties to litigation, they
argued, often presented expert testimony of dubious validity because it sup-
ported their positions, while lay juries were incapable of discerning which
side had the better case.  But it took the rise of toxic tort litigation based on
questionable causation theories and the attendant threat to multi-billion dol-
lar industries to provoke a meaningful response from the courts—a sudden
and dramatic shift toward stricter admissibility standards.
Part II describes the Daubert trilogy and the emergence of amended Rule
702.  A pattern emerged of the Supreme Court attempting to strengthen the
rules governing expert testimony, some lower courts resisting, and the Court
responding by issuing a new opinion clarifying the courts’ new “gatekeeping”
responsibilities.  Eventually, an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
codified the Daubert trilogy, and did so with language that removed ambigui-
ties and loopholes that had been exploited by judges who had been inclined
to try to evade the Court’s rulings.
Nevertheless, as Part III describes, some federal judges have continued
to apply significantly more lenient standards for expert testimony than Rule
702 permits.  They do so by ignoring the language of Rule 702, and instead
2012), http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=295; Nathan A. Schachtman, Milward—
Unhinging the Courthouse Door to Dubious Scientific Evidence, SCHACHTMANLAW.COM (Sept. 2,
2011, 8:13 AM), http://schachtmanlaw.com/milward-unhinging-the-courthouse-door-to-
dubious-scientific-evidence; Eric Swan, Milward and the First Circuit’s Weight-of-the-Evidence
Approach, DRITODAY (Sept. 11, 2012), http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=420.
23 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Milward, 132 S. Ct. 1002 (2012).
24 Indeed, it already has. See Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc., 686 F.3d 618, 625 (8th Cir. 2012)
(“[T]rial courts are not empowered ‘to determine which of several competing scientific
theories has the best provenance.’” (quoting Milward, 639 F.3d at 15)); In re Fosamax
(Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 11–5304, 08–08, 2013 WL 1558690, at *4
(D.N.J. April 10, 2013) (citing only Milward in support of its statement that the “Defendant
is free to address these issues on cross-examination, but Defendant’s concerns do not pro-
hibit Dr. Cornell from testifying as an expert because he is qualified and the methodology
he used is sufficiently reliable”); Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09cv1935 AJB (DHB), 2013 WL
1498965, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2013) (citing only Milward in explaining why it was
denying a defense motion to exclude expert testimony); In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods.
Liab. Litig., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1300 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (relying on Milward in asserting
that any testimony on which reasonable scientists can disagree is admissible).
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relying on precedents from a bygone era.  The First Circuit’s Milward opin-
ion, described in detail in Part III, demonstrates many errors and fallacies
common to judges who have chosen to resist the Daubert revolution.
The underlying issue tying the history and present controversy over the
admissibility of evidence in toxic tort litigation is a dispute over the underly-
ing rationale for having special rules for the admissibility of expert testimony.
Judges who favor more liberal rules for admissibility believe that the rules are
meant to address only the problem of “junk science”—scientific testimony
that not only falls outside the scientific mainstream, but does so in the face of
well-accepted contrary evidence.25
More restrictive judges, by contrast, are addressing the broader problem
of “adversarial bias” that results from our legal system allowing the parties to
choose their own experts.  Parties to litigation have a natural inclination to
choose experts whose views match their theory of the case, even if those
experts are outliers or hired guns.  Rule 702 tries to limit this problem by
insisting that experts show an objectively verifiable basis for their testimony, so
that the trier of fact is not in the position of relying on the mere ipse dixit of
an expert chosen solely because his views are consistent with the partisan
position of a party to litigation.26
This Article concludes by discussing some of the factors that have led
some federal judges to defy Rule 702.  The author contends that the
Supreme Court should take an appropriate opportunity to crack down on
such judicial rebellion for two reasons.  First, Rule 702 is the law of the land,
and federal judges are obligated to enforce it regardless of their personal
views on what expert testimony should be admissible.  Second, Rule 702 rep-
resents a constructive effort to confront the problem of adversarial bias while
retaining the basic contours of the broader adversarial process.
I. THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY THROUGH DAUBERT
Before Daubert, American courts generally applied a very forgiving test
when considering the admissibility of expert testimony.  Courts required only
that an expert be at least marginally qualified to testify on the subject at
hand, and that his testimony be relevant to an issue in the case.27  The only
significant limitation was that the expert’s testimony had to be “beyond the
ken of the jury.”28
25 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that expert testimony was admissible because it wasn’t
“junk science” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26 See id. at 143 (majority opinion).
27 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 2.1 (describing the traditional rules for the admissi- R
bility of expert testimony).
28 Id. § 2.1.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The main exception was that “many
jurisdictions applied the general acceptance test of Frye v. United States to scientific testi-
mony, mostly in criminal cases.” Id. § 1.2 (footnote omitted).  Contrary to myth, however,
Frye was not traditionally a significant barrier to expert testimony. See David E. Bernstein,
Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J.
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Even this restriction on expert testimony gradually withered.  Many
courts ruled that any potentially helpful expert testimony was admissible.29
Any flaws in an expert’s testimony were issues of weight, not admissibility.  To
the extent there were problems with an expert’s methodology or reasoning,
opposing counsel’s only recourse was to try to alert the trier of fact to these
problems at trial through cross-examination.30  Federal Rule of Evidence
702, enacted in 1975 and eventually adopted by most states, did away with the
“beyond the ken of the jury” test in favor of a helpfulness test.31
These very liberal admissibility rules coexisted with deep suspicion of
expert testimony.32  Critics charged that the incentive structure facing liti-
gants and the experts themselves made the prevalence of biased, one-sided
expert testimony inevitable.33  The underlying problem critics identified is
that attorneys seeking expert witnesses do not, and have no incentive to, pur-
sue expertise wherever it leads.  Rather, they search for an expert willing to
support the litigant’s position.34  Expert testimony in the United States is
385, 394–95 (2001) (noting that the civil cases applying Frye were limited largely to pater-
nity tests and techniques more often used in criminal investigations); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2008)
(“Through 1970, [Frye] was cited only fifty-eight times, and the bulk of those cases involved
the lie detector, the same technology at issue in Frye.”).  Even accounting for the fact that
some “general acceptance” cases did not cite Frye, the general acceptance test was applied
sparingly.
29 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 2.2.2. R
30 See id.
31 Original Rule 702 provided: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .” 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MAR-
GARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702App.01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed.,
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2013).  Despite what seems to be rather clear language, some
courts continued to nevertheless apply the “beyond the ken” test.
32 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 2.1. R
33 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1132 (“The prob-
lem is professional partisanship.  Experts whose incomes depend on testimony must learn
to satisfy the consumers who buy that testimony; those who do not will not get hired.”).
34 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.3.1 (“Perhaps the most frequent criticism of R
experts was that they too often became partisans, the hired mouthpieces for the parties’
points of view instead of the objective spokesmen for scientific truth.”).
For examples, see Lucilius A. Emery, Medical Expert Evidence, 39 AM. L. REV. 481, 488
(1905) (stating that partisanship is “the most prolific cause of the disrepute in which medi-
cal evidence is held”); William L. Foster, Expert Testimony,—Prevalent Complaints and Pro-
posed Remedies, 11 HARV. L. REV. 169, 171 (1897) (reporting that complaints of “bias”
against experts are frequent); Henry Wollman, “Physicians—Expert Witnesses.”  “Some
Reforms.”, 17 MEDICO-LEG. J. 20, 28 (1899) (“The public believes that expert testimony is a
hired, a purchased commodity, and that the number of experts on each side is measured
by the size of the purse of the respective sides.  That it is just as easy to obtain the same
expert on one side as on the other, if you only ‘have the price.’  That the expert has no
conscientious scruples about the side he is on.  That he doesn’t think about the side, only
the money.”).  As Susan Haack puts it, attorneys are not interested in inquiry, but in advo-
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therefore subject to massive adversarial bias—bias that arises because experts
are hired to advance the cause of one party to an adversarial proceeding.35
Critics identified three distinct types of adversarial bias: (1) conscious
bias, which occurs when an expert deliberately tailors evidence to support a
client, (2) unconscious bias, which occurs when the expert does not inten-
tionally mislead the court, but is influenced by psychological attachment to
his “side,” and (3) selection bias, which results from litigants choosing as
their expert witnesses persons whose views are known to support the litigants’
position.36  So in some cases attorneys would deploy “hired guns,”37 in
others, especially in the forensic context, they would find “team players,”38
and, perhaps most frequently, they would simply select from the supply of
available and honest experts those who had sincere views on the issue at
hand that happened to coincide with what the attorney needed them to say
to advance his client’s case.
Many reformers argued that the appropriate remedy to adversarial bias
(combined with inexpert juries) was increased reliance on court-appointed,
nonpartisan experts.39  Learned Hand, writing in the Harvard Law Review in
1901, asked, “[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each
cacy. See Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science?  An Essay in Legal Episte-
mology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1070 (2008).
35 See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456–57 (2008) (discussing adversarial bias).
36 Id. at 454–56.  These forms of bias have been recognized since at least Abinger v.
Ashton, 17 L.R. Eq. 358, 373–75 (Ch. 1873).
37 L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
1389, 1389 (1995); see also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370,
382 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[E]xpert[s] . . . are ‘often the mere paid advocates or partisans of
those who employ and pay them, as much so as the attorneys who conduct the suit.  There
is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved by some so-
called “experts.”’” (quoting Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 78 N.W. 965, 966
(Minn. 1899)); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 553
(Tex. 1995) (“[T]here are some experts who ‘are more than willing to proffer opinions of
dubious value for the proper fee.’” (quoting 2 STEVEN GOODE ET AL., TEXAS PRACTICE:
GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 702.2, at 17 (2d ed.
1993))); Dan L. Burk, When Scientists Act Like Lawyers: The Problem of Adversary Science, 33
JURIMETRICS J. 363, 368–70 (1993) (discussing the causes of “adversary science” in the
courts).
38 See DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 68 (2010); see
Gross, supra note 33, at 1139 (noting that the process of preparing witnesses “pushes the R
expert to identify with the lawyers on her side and to become a partisan member of the
litigation team”); Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 255,
256 (2005); Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPP. I) S107, S111 (2005); D. Michael Risin-
ger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–30 (2002).
39 The most famous commentary on point was Learned Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 56–57 (1901); see also Emery,
supra note 34, at 492–93; G.A. Endlich, Proposed Changes in the Law of Expert Testimony, 32 R
AM. L. REV. 851, 853–54 (1898); Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in the Conduct of Judi-
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founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own?  It is
just because [jurors] are incompetent for such a task that the expert is neces-
sary at all.”40  But despite recurring suggestions that the American legal sys-
tem limit or even eliminate expert witnesses selected by parties to litigation,41
court-appointed experts were and remain rare.42
For decades, the American legal system soldiered on with adversarial
experts subject to forgiving admissibility rules.  The system was shaken out of
its complacency by the increased use of scientific evidence in criminal cases
starting in the early 1970s.43  Faced with novel forensic techniques such as
voiceprint analysis, hair analysis, and so on, courts increasingly adopted and
applied the Frye general acceptance test, named after a 1923 decision involv-
ing primitive lie detectors, to such evidence.44  Some federal courts—either
thinking themselves constrained by the Federal Rules of Evidence to eschew
cial Inquiries, 21 AM. L. REV. 571, 572 (1887); Emory Washburn, Testimony of Experts, 1 AM.
L. REV. 45, 61–62 (1867).
40 Hand, supra note 39, at 54.  For a modern reiteration of Hand’s question, see Scott R
Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1552–53
(1998) (“[I]f a judge or a jury does not have the requisite scientific training, how can that
judge or jury make a warranted choice between competing ‘vigorously cross-examined’
claims by putative experts in, say, medicine, mathematics, chemistry, or biology?”).
41 For numerous examples of recurring suggestions for the elimination of adversarial
experts, see Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1393–96 (2006). See generally KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 11.2 R
(“[F]rom the later part of the nineteenth century to the present, the dominant proposed
solution to the problems of adversarial experts has been to call for the use of non-adver-
sarial experts, in order to create a nonpartisan source of expert knowledge.”); see also
Gross, supra note 33, at 1188 (describing the use of non-partisan experts as “[t]he most R
frequently suggested reform”).
Several recent articles favor court-appointed experts, at least in some contexts. See,
e.g., Sofia Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, The Independent Expert Evolution: From the “Path of Least
Resistance” to the “Road Less Traveled?,” 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 843, 882–97 (2003); David E.
Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 486–510 (1999) (reviewing MARCIA
ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL (1996)); Ryan M. Seidemann et al., Closing the Gate on Questiona-
ble Expert Witness Testimony: A Proposal to Institute Expert Review Panels, 33 S.U. L. REV. 29,
69–85 (2005); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent
Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1425–38 (2003); Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias,
Daubert, and the Silicone Breast Implant Litigation: Making the Case for Court-Appointed Experts
in Complex Medical and Scientific Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 154, 161–63 (2002).
42 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 11.2.3, (“[B]y all accounts judges exercise these R
powers infrequently.”); Michael J. Saks, The Phantom of the Courthouse, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 233,
234 (1995) (reviewing JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS
(1993)) (“Rule 706[, providing for the appointment of experts] . . . is a rule that was never
really intended to be used.  And not using it is what most judges do with it most of the
time.”).
43 See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 898 (2013) (“Although Frye
was decided in 1923, it did not achieve true notoriety until the 1970s . . . .”); Paul C.
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1980).
44 See Giannelli, supra note 43, at 1206–07. R
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Frye, or persuaded by critiques of Frye that began to circulate in judicial opin-
ions and scholarly articles—began to develop a reliability test to screen scien-
tific evidence.45
Even more momentous, in the late 1970s, plaintiffs began to file what
turned into a wave of “toxic tort” lawsuits—litigation alleging that exposure
to pharmaceuticals, pollutants, or other toxic substances caused cancer, birth
defects, or other ailments.  Early examples of such litigation included cases
alleging harm caused by the swine flu vaccine,46 claims that the morning
sickness drug Bendectin caused birth defects,47 and lawsuits arguing that can-
cer and other harms were caused by the defoliant Agent Orange when it was
used during the Vietnam War.48  Litigation over these products involved
hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs, and put vast sums of money and entire
industries at risk.  These cases also brought a new wave of complex expert
testimony to the courts, and added great urgency to the question of whether
the traditional battle of partisan experts was a sound way of resolving factual
disputes.49
One group of judges and commentators supported the retention of
traditional liberal rules for admissibility of expert testimony.  They con-
tended that testimony by a qualified expert who claimed to find causation by
relying on some supporting evidence based on accepted scientific methodolo-
gies should be admissible to prove causation in a toxic torts case without
further inquiry as to the testimony’s reliability.
The leading case adopting this perspective, and probably the leading
case on the admissibility of expert testimony in toxic torts cases pre-Daubert,
45 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238–39 (3d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198–99 (2d Cir. 1978).
46 See, e.g., Lima v. United States (In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig.),
508 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981), aff‘d sub nom. Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th
Cir. 1983).
47 For overviews, see generally GREEN, supra note 4; SANDERS, supra note 4.  For a dis- R
cussion of the harm to public health caused by this litigation, see David E. Bernstein, Learn-
ing the Wrong Lessons from “An American Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed
Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1961, 1962–67 (2006).
48 See SCHUCK, supra note 4; Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evi- R
dence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86
NW. U. L. REV. 643, 671–80 (1992).
49 Ironically, one product that clearly caused significant harm to the public, cigarettes,
was subject to only minimal litigation at this time.  A first wave of lawsuits against cigarette
makers in the 1950s and 1960s utterly failed, and such litigation did not return with any
force until the late 1980s. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litiga-
tion, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 857, 864 (1992); Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical
Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING POLICY 110, 110–25 (Robert L. Rabin &
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993); Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litiga-
tion, in REGULATING TOBACCO 176, 176–97 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
2001); Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
331, 332–47 (2001); Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Prom-
ise, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1721, 1732–44 (2008).
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was the 1984 D.C. Circuit case of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.50 Ferebee
involved a claim that exposure to a herbicide caused an individual’s cancer.
The case involved a unique workplace exposure, and therefore was not the
sort of issue for which one could expect to have sufficient epidemiological
data.  Instead, the plaintiff’s expert relied, rather vaguely, on “tissue samples,
standard tests, and patient examination” to support his causation
testimony.51
The Ferebee court held that this testimony was admissible, because the
“basic methodology” used by the expert was “sound.”52  The court did not
explain how reviewing “tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examina-
tion” was a sound methodology for discovering whether a particular chemical
causes cancer, much less whether exposure to that chemical caused a given
individual’s cancer.  Rather, the court was content to rely on the expert’s
judgment that such evidence was sufficient for him to conclude that the her-
bicide exposure caused the plaintiff’s cancer.
The court explained its rationale as follows:
[P]roducts liability law does not preclude recovery until a “statistically signifi-
cant” number of people have been injured or until science has had the time
and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemi-
cal. . . . [T]he fact that . . . science would require more evidence before
conclusively considering the causation question resolved is irrelevant.53
The court added that the fact that this “case may have been the first of
its exact type, or that [the plaintiff’s] doctors may have been the first alert
enough to recognize such a case, does not mean that the testimony of those
doctors, who are concededly well-qualified in their fields, should not have
been admitted.”54  “On questions such as these, which stand at the frontier of
current medical and epidemiological inquiry,” the court concluded, “if
experts are willing to testify that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide
whether to credit such testimony.”55
50 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); accord City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827
F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986);
Bandura v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 664 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 865 F.2d 816
(7th Cir. 1988). See generally Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1138 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (describing Ferebee as “a leading case”); Alani Golanski, Judicial Scrutiny of Expert Testi-
mony in Environmental Tort Litigation, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 399, 406 (1992) (noting that
Ferebee was frequently cited as a leading case favoring liberal standards for the admissibility
of expert causation testimony).  Some Frye courts continue to utilize similar reasoning in
defending their choice not to scrutinize plaintiffs’ experts’ reasoning in toxic tort cases.
See Nonnon v. City of New York, 819 N.Y.S.2d 705, 715 (App. Div. 2006) (refusing to apply
Frye to a toxic exposure case because applying the general acceptance test to such cases
would prevent plaintiffs “suffering the ill effects . . . of environmental contaminants” from
obtaining compensation).
51 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536.
52 Id. at 1535–36.
53 Id. at 1536.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1534.
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The difficulty with Ferebee is that it implicitly treated plaintiffs’ experts in
toxic torts cases as if their status as qualified experts meant that their reason-
ing and conclusions necessarily reflected the views of a reputable segment of
their scientific peers.  In fact, however, due to adversarial bias in this context,
this assumption is wrong.56  A toxic tort plaintiff with even marginally sugges-
tive evidence of general causation has little trouble finding qualified experts
from among the tens of thousands of at least minimally qualified American
physicians, toxicologists, and so on who are willing to testify that specific cau-
sation should be extrapolated from such evidence.
Ferebee’s forgiving rhetoric became a rallying cry for courts inclined to
admit extremely dubious expert testimony in a variety of toxic tort con-
texts.57  A series of verdicts for plaintiffs followed in cases in which experts
presented testimony that at best went well beyond available scientific knowl-
edge, and at worst relied on utter balderdash.58
For example, there were several multi-million dollar verdicts against
defendants based on the thoroughly discredited theories of a group of medi-
cal charlatans who called themselves “clinical ecologists.”59  In one infamous
case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a five million dollar award to a plaintiff
who alleged that his birth defects resulted from his mother’s use of a com-
mon spermicide.60  An attorney in a Bendectin case won a ninety-five million
dollar verdict thanks to his expert’s claim to have pieced together an “eviden-
tiary mosaic” to support his causation theory.61
56 See Bernstein, supra note 35, at 465–67; Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert R
Witness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 77 (2009) (“Witnesses are chosen because they
prefer a point of view, and the very choice of experts clouds the degree of consensus that
may surround a topic.”).  It’s worth noting that Ferebee was problematic because of its rea-
soning, not necessarily because of its result.  A recent review of Ferebee concludes that the
D.C. Circuit’s ruling may not have been a miscarriage of justice.  The plaintiff may very well
have had reliable expert testimony of causation, even though the D.C. Circuit did not
explain why that was true and also seemed to disclaim the need for reliable testimony. See
Nathan A. Schachtman, Ferebee Revisited, SCHACHTMANLAW.COM (Nov. 8th, 2012, 2:27 PM),
http://schachtmanlaw.com/ferebee-revisited/.
57 See Golanski, supra note 50, at 406 (noting that Ferebee was frequently cited as a R
leading case favoring liberal standards for the admissibility of expert causation testimony).
58 See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 3 (reviewing many of these cases, and comparing con- R
clusions of scientists in reviews of the relevant scientific literature to the how courts treated
the same issues); HUBER, supra note 3 (providing accounts of many of these cases); HANS R
ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES 45–68 (1997) (discussing some of these
cases).
59 See, e.g., Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (compensa-
tory and punitive damages totaling forty-nine million dollars).  For harsh criticism of Elam,
see Richard S. Cornfeld & Stuart F. Schlossman, Immunologic Laboratory Tests: A Critique of
the Alcolac Decision, in PHANTOM RISK, supra note 3, at 401. R
60 See Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 747–48 (11th Cir. 1986).
61 See Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. 1986) (“Like
the pieces of a mosaic, the individual studies showed little or nothing when viewed sepa-
rately from one another, but they combined to produce a whole that was greater than the
sum of its parts: a foundation for Dr. Done’s opinion that Bendectin caused appellant’s
birth defects.”).
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Such verdicts led to withering criticism from within and without the
legal community.62  Editorialists in science journals and newspapers like the
New York Times called for stricter controls on expert testimony.63  In the face
of such criticism, many courts backtracked somewhat.  The D.C. Circuit itself
limited Ferebee’s very porous admissibility standard to cases in which the
defendants could not present strong contradictory epidemiological or other
evidence disproving causation.64 Ferebee came to stand for the proposition
that a party may proffer speculative scientific expert testimony if the issue was
on the “frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry,”65 and the
expert was relying on a methodology used in the mainstream scientific
community.66
Meanwhile, verdicts for plaintiffs based on questionable causation theo-
ries continued to pile up, leading to increased criticism through the early
1990s.67  The problem, according to critics, was not simply experts testifying
62 For an example of criticism from the medical profession, see BD. OF TRS., AM. MED.
ASSOC., IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLO-
GIES (1988) [hereinafter IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY].
63 See James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Occasional Notes: Teratogens and “Litogens,”
315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234–35 (1986); Federal Judges vs. Science, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
1986, § 1, at 22.
64 See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311, modified on other grounds, 884 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Defendants rarely have such evidence on their side, especially in the early stages of mass
litigation, but they did eventually benefit from such evidence in the Bendectin litigation.
See generally Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1962–70 (reviewing the Bendectin litigation).  And R
they eventually also benefited in the breast implant litigation. See Bernstein, supra note 41, R
at 480–84.
65 Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 763 F.2d. 1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
66 Richardson, 857 F.2d at 832 (reaffirming Ferebee, but limiting it to expert testimony
regarding issues on the frontier of scientific inquiry); see also Christophersen v. Allied-Sig-
nal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing Ferebee and
noting “through traditional methods . . . the relationship between nickel, cadmium, and
small-cell colon cancer is scant”); In re Benedectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 748
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding the underlying data of a study must be “reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field”); Bandura v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 664 F. Supp. 1218, 1219
(N.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 865 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating an expert’s study should be
admitted if the results are reasonable); Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 576 A.2d 4, 14–15
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (stating evidence should be admitted as long as a reasona-
ble expert could come to the same conclusion as the expert).  The D.C. Circuit, for exam-
ple, held that animal studies and chemical structure analyses that were not admissible to
prove that Bendectin caused a plaintiff’s birth defects, because there was a great deal of
contrary data.  The same type of studies, however, were admissible to prove that Depo
Provera caused that plaintiff’s birth defects, an issue that had not been widely studied. See
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
67 A key, but hardly the only, factor prompting the attention that the issue received,
was HUBER, supra note 3.  For criticism in non-legal periodicals, see IMPACT OF PRODUCT R
LIABILITY, supra note 62, at 9; Bert Black, Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 239 SCI. 1508, 1511 (1988) (questioning judges’ ability to properly
examine scientific studies and urging courts to use consistency within the scientific com-
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against a great weight of contrary evidence.  Rather, courts erred in allowing
experts to speculate or guess that causation existed based on weak data that
did not reach a minimum threshold of scientific reliability.68  Due to selec-
tion bias, there was (and is) no shortage of sincere, well-qualified expert wit-
nesses “who . . . confuse hypothesis with confirmed fact, and testify . . . to the
actual existence of causal relations or substantially enhanced risks on weak or
no evidence.”69
A few courts—fed up with what they saw as the laxity of their colleagues
in admitting unreliable testimony produced by selection bias—began to
search for a means of ensuring that expert testimony had some objective
basis before admitting it into evidence.  Some courts adopted the reliability
test pioneered in the toxic tort context by the Agent Orange opinion.70  The
reliability test’s popularity grew to the point that the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed amending the rules of evidence
to allow only expert testimony that is “reasonably reliable and will substan-
tially assist the trier of fact.”71  Early incarnations of the reliability test, how-
munity as their barometer); Blake Fleetwood, From the People Who Brought You the Twinkie
Defense, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1987, at 33 (examining the expert witness industry); Con-
stance Holden, Science in Court, 243 SCI. 1658, 1658 (1989) (questioning judges’ ability to
properly examine scientific studies and suggesting emulation of the expert evidence rules
of European countries); Eliot Marshall, Immune System Theories on Trial, 234 SCI. 1490, 1492
(1986) (stating that normal immune levels must be established before courts rule on the
admissibility of studies reflecting their change); Walter Olson, The Case Against Expert Wit-
nesses, FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989, at 134, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/for-
tune/fortune_archive/1989/09/25/72505.  For criticism in the legal academic literature,
see Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988) [here-
inafter Black, Unified Theory]; Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testi-
mony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986); E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three
Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1989); Fredrick I. Lederer,
Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79, 84–145
(1987); James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend
Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249 (1986); David Bernstein, Note, Out of the
Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG.
117, 138–42 (1990); Paul F. Rothstein & Michael Crew, When Should the Judge Keep Expert
Testimony from the Jury?, INSIDE LITIG., Apr. 1987, at 19.
68 See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 433 (contending that courts must assess “the R
relevance of data to health and the reliability of scientific inferences” (emphasis omitted)).
69 D. Michael Risinger, A Functional Taxonomy of Expertise, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE § 2:15, at 106 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2005-2006 ed. 2005).
70 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); see Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Labs, 830 F.2d 1190, 1196 (1st Cir.
1987); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987).
71 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 83 (1991).  The Judicial Conference Advisory Com-
mittee eventually took no action, and instead referred the issue to the new Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2 (Sept. 1991).
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ever, did not prove a consistent barrier to junk science.72 A few courts, most
prominently the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits,73 instead applied the Frye
general acceptance test, which had previously been largely limited to forensic
science evidence in criminal cases,74 to exclude toxic tort evidence.
There things stood in the early 1990s, while all sides of the controversy
waited for the Supreme Court to weigh in.75  While the let-it-all-in approach
was clearly dying out,76 significant controversy remained as to both the
underlying problem and the underlying solution.  On one side were courts
and commentators that believed that the problem was obvious quackery.
Some of these jurists believed that juries could be relied upon to reject such
quackery.  But most acknowledged that courts should exclude experts who
either rely on discredited methodologies like clinical ecology or, as in the
context of Bendectin litigation, who present causation theories that conflict
with a great deal of sound contrary evidence published in reputable scientific
journals.  However, in cases in which respectable scientists were willing to
find causation based on incomplete and speculative evidence where no scien-
tific consensus existed, the traditional battle of the experts should reign.
For other courts and commentators, the problem was far broader.  The
essential problem was not “junk science” in toxic tort litigation per se, but the
problematic nature of relying on experts subject to adversarial bias to present
opinions to lay jurors that relied solely on the experts’ say-so, unsupported by
72 See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 959 (3d Cir. 1990) (approv-
ing, in a jurisdiction that had adopted the reliability test, the admissibility of testimony that
Bendectin caused a plaintiff’s birth defects, which by this point was contrary to a vast body
of epidemiological data); Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solu-
tion to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 203 (1992) (noting that the reliabil-
ity standard is problematic when “used to justify such minimal scrutiny of the reliability of
scientific evidence, particularly of expert opinion testimony, that it amounts to no standard
at all”).
73 See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (per curiam); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129–31 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208
(6th Cir. 1988). Sterling didn’t cite Frye, but did apply the general acceptance test. Id.
74 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 107, at 853
(1977) (“The Frye standard . . . is rarely applied in civil litigation; Frye itself has been cited
only in a very few civil cases, principally in state courts in connection with blood tests to
determine paternity.”); FAUST F. ROSSI, EXPERT WITNESSES 36 (1991) (“The Frye standard
traditionally has been applied almost exclusively in criminal cases.”).
75 The Court had repeatedly declined to address the issue. See, e.g., Ealy v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990); Christopher-
sen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991)
(en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992); Richardson v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Brock v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
76 See Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La.),
795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (denouncing the “let it all in” approach to expert
testimony (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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objective evidence such as peer-reviewed, published studies.77  Such critics
favored broadening the inquiry beyond whether an expert was relying on an
accepted methodology and instead also inquiring as to whether the expert
was using the methodology in a reliable way in a given case.78  Moreover,
these courts and commentators rejected the notion that an absence of strong
contrary evidence dictated that they should be lax about admitting causation
evidence.  Additionally, this side of the debate thought all expert testimony
should be subject to significant scrutiny for reliability, given that all experts
are subject to adversarial bias.79
II. THE DAUBERT TRILOGY AND FRE 702 (AS AMENDED)
The contours of the debate over the admissibility of expert testimony in
toxic tort litigation seem a lot clearer in retrospect than they did contempo-
raneously, because at the time the plaintiffs’ bar still held out hope that the
let-it-all-in approach would be revived by the Supreme Court.  Instead, in
1993, the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.80 expressly rejected the let-it-all-in standard in favor of a new reliability
standard.  This opinion, however, did not resolve the conflict between those
who thought the problem of quackspertise in court should be resolved by
minor tinkering to prevent the most egregious examples of dubious testi-
mony in toxic torts cases from being admitted, and those who advocated a
more stringent approach that broadly tackled the problem of adversarial
bias.
Supporters of more lenient rules for admissibility pointed to language in
Daubert noting “the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules [of Evidence] and
their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testi-
mony,”81 and emphasizing the “flexible” nature of the inquiry trial courts
must engage in.82  The Court expressed optimism about the capabilities of
the adversarial process and of the jury, and spoke of “shaky but admissible
evidence.”83  Finally, the Court emphasized that the admissibility inquiry
must be focused “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclu-
77 See HUBER, supra note 3, at 204 (“The only way to tell that expertise is based on R
objective experience is to see whether others with similar experience favor similar meth-
ods, adopt similar procedures, embrace similar theories, and reach similar conclusions.”).
78 See, e.g., FOSTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 433; Black, Unified Theory, supra note 67, at R
599 (contending that courts should consider “the validity of the reasoning leading to a
conclusion” (emphasis omitted)).
79 See HUBER, supra note 3 (dealing not only with toxic tort cases, but with medical
evidence and engineering quackspertise); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assess-
ing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1009–10
(1989) (“The legal relevance of social science findings should depend on their scientific
strength, that is, on the ability of social scientists to answer validly the questions posed to
them.” (footnote omitted)).
80 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
81 Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Id. at 594.
83 Id. at 596.
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sions that they generate.”84  The latter language seemed consistent with cases
like Ferebee.  It suggested the possibility that, post-Daubert, an expert need only
show that his very general methodology (such as, “extrapolating from animal
studies”85) could be considered reliable, regardless of how carefully or com-
petently the expert utilized that methodology in the case at hand.86
On the other hand, Daubert insisted that trial court judges adopt “a
gatekeeping role”87 to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”88  The Court listed five
substantive factors—including general acceptance and whether the expert
relied on peer-reviewed, published studies—as examples of how the district
courts might approach this task.89  And in direct contrast to the “methodol-
ogy only” language, the Court charged trial courts with assessing “whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue.”90  “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard,” the Court added,
“requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondi-
tion to admissibility.”91
So there was sufficient language in the opinion to allow both sides to
declare victory.  The Court could have clarified matters by applying its newly
announced standard to the evidence rejected by the courts below.  Instead, it
simply remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.  The Court also could have
signaled its intentions by ruling on whether the new reliability approach
applied only to scientific evidence (suggesting that it only wanted to reign in
the egregious misuse of causation evidence, as in the Bendectin litigation) or
to all expert testimony (suggesting that it was trying to address the underly-
ing issue of adversarial bias by adopting a broad reliability test).  Instead, the
Court expressly declined to address the issue.92
News reports of the decision reflected divergent understandings of just
what the Court had done.93  Commentators were similarly divided.  The
84 Id. at 595.
85 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 781 n.47 (3d Cir. 1994).
86 See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert’s “Focus” Seriously: The Methodology/Conclu-
sion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1748–49 (1994); Michael H. Gottesman, Admissi-
bility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The “Prestige” Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 869–72 (1994)
(arguing that under Daubert, courts may only assess experts’ general methodology).
87 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
88 Id. at 589.
89 Id. at 593–94.
90 Id. at 592–93.
91 Id. at 591–92.
92 Id. at 590 n.8.  For commentary on this omission, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability
of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2291 (1994).
93 The New York Times reported that “[t]he 7-to-2 decision invited judges to be aggres-
sive in screening out ill-founded or speculative scientific theories.”  Linda Greenhouse,
Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Put Judges in Charge of Deciding Reliability of Scientific Testimony,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at A13.  The Wall Street Journal, by contrast, suggested that the
ruling favored plaintiffs seeking more liberal admissibility standards. See Paul M. Barrett,
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author of this Article believed that Daubert required what on average would
amount to significantly increased judicial scrutiny of expert testimony to
ensure reliability.94  The Court’s more forgiving remarks seemed aimed pri-
marily at a mythical version of Frye, understood as an “austere” rule that
made it extremely difficult to present expert testimony.95  In fact, courts
rarely if ever applied Frye in a harsh, unforgiving way.96  Moreover, courts
usually applied Frye only to very narrow categories of evidence. Daubert’s criti-
cisms of Frye were therefore not especially apposite.97  What was important,
however, was Daubert’s focus on the reliability of expert testimony, its sugges-
tion of several pertinent and reasonably strict criteria for determining relia-
bility, and, in contrast to Frye’s traditional narrow scope, the Supreme Court’s
insistence that the new standard applied to all scientific evidence.98
Nevertheless, as noted, not everyone agreed, and Daubert became some-
thing of a Rorschach test revealing judges’ preexisting views about how
strictly trial courts should scrutinize expert testimony.  Courts that were
strongly inclined before Daubert to adopt more forgiving understandings of
admissibility standards often continued to do so after Daubert.  Indeed, the
D.C. Circuit, where Ferebee was conceived, favorably cited and applied Ferebee
three years after Daubert.99
Justices Rule Against Business in Evidence Case, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1993, at A3; see also
Margaret A. Berger, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Venerable ‘Frye’ Standard, N.Y.L.J., July 19,
1993, at S3 (“Both sides immediately claimed victory . . . .”); Paul Houston, High Court
Relaxes Curbs on Expert Witness Testimony Law: Ruling Praised by Backers of Flexibility.  Business
Interests Also Claim Victory in Birth-Defects Case, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 1993), http://articles.
latimes.com/1993-06-29/news/mn-8393_1_expert-testimony (quoting the attorneys’
reactions).
94 See David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2139 (1994); David E. Bernstein &
Peter W. Huber, Defense Perspective, 1 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q. 59, 60 (1993) (“The
trend towards stricter scrutiny of scientific evidence began in the late-1980s; in the after-
math of Daubert it will accelerate.”); David Bernstein, Hauling Junk Science Out of the Court-
room, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1993, at A16 (“[A]s standards are established, [Daubert] means
that junk science will have a far harder time making it to court.”).
95 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
96 KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 9.2.1 (“Before Daubert, it was clear that the elevated R
scrutiny reserved for scientific evidence applied to the methodology that an expert
employed and not to the conclusions that the expert reached by applying that methodol-
ogy to specific facts.”).
97 As Michael Green notes: “To say that the Supreme Court replaced Frye in its Daubert
opinion is misleading.  What the Court did in Daubert was to adopt a test for scrutinizing an
expert’s methodology and reasoning that filled a previously extant void.”  Michael D.
Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (and Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking in Products Liability,
49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 398 (1999).
98 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11 (“Although the Frye decision itself focused exclu-
sively on ‘novel’ scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to
apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence.”).
99 The court held that highly speculative expert testimony indicating that Depo
Provera caused the plaintiff’s birth defects was admissible because “there is no ‘overwhelm-
ing body of contradictory epidemiological evidence’ to [the expert’s] conclusion.”
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Consider as well the post-Daubert Ninth Circuit case of Hopkins v. Dow
Corning Corp.100 Hopkins involved a claim that silicone breast implants caused
a woman’s immune system disease.  This claim had no reliable scientific evi-
dence behind it, and the notion that breast implants cause immune system
disease became discredited as contrary evidence accumulated.101 Hopkins
was a momentous opinion, with the fate of the multi-billion dollar breast
implant litigation resting in significant part on the court’s decision whether
to uphold a jury verdict for the plaintiff.102  Yet the Ninth Circuit provided
only the most superficial and cursory examination of the plaintiff’s expert
testimony.  For example, here is all the court had to say about the admissibil-
ity of the testimony of a key plaintiffs’ expert: “Dr. Vasey, a rheumatologist,
testified that his opinion was based on medical records, his clinical experi-
ence, preliminary results of an epidemiological study[,] and medical litera-
ture.  Thus, we conclude the ‘reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid . . . .’”103
Despite cases like Hopkins, the trend toward stricter scrutiny of expert
testimony accelerated because of the attention the “gatekeeper” requirement
received, and because the Court had suggested several relatively stringent
criteria for scrutinizing expert testimony.104  Indeed, in contrast to Hopkins,
two Ninth Circuit opinions rejected the “methodologies/conclusions” dis-
tinction,105 and on remand from Daubert itself, the court issued an opinion
widely seen as adopting a strict interpretation of the Supreme Court’s rul-
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (applying and citing Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see Michael D. Green, Relief at
the Frying of Frye: Reflections on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1 SHEPARD’S
EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q. 43, 47–48 (1993) (suggesting that Daubert adopted Ferebee-like stan-
dards in cases on the frontier of medical science); see also McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61
F.3d 1038, 1043–45 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding the admission of a treating physician’s testi-
mony that glue fumes caused the plaintiff’s throat polyps, despite the absence of any scien-
tific literature suggesting such a relationship); Alexander Morgan Capron, Daubert and the
Quest for Value-Free “Scientific Knowledge” in the Courtroom, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 85, 106 (1996)
(predicting that “the courts [will] read Daubert as encouraging liberal allowance of testi-
mony whenever there is any well credentialed scientist who supports the theory”).
100 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994).
101 For an early post-mortem of the litigation, see Bernstein, supra note 41, at 472–76, R
485–93.
102 See id. at 472–73.
103 Hopkins, 33 F.3d at 1125 (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at
592–93).  Part of the fault likely lies with the defendants’ attorneys, who chose in their
brief to primarily rely on a statute of limitations argument that was inconsistent with their
secondary reliance on Daubert.
104 See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FED-
ERAL CIVIL TRIALS 4 (2000) (finding that Daubert significantly increased judges’ willingness
to serve as gatekeepers).
105 See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996) (“When a
scientist claims to rely on a method practiced by most scientists, yet presents conclusions
that are shared by no other scientist, the district court should be wary that the method has
not been faithfully applied.”); Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1994)
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ing.106  Other courts also adopted an exacting interpretation of Daubert,
sometimes specifically referencing the problems attendant to adversarial bias
(albeit without using that terminology).107
For several years, the Supreme Court allowed the debate over the proper
interpretation of Daubert to simmer in the lower courts.  The Court inter-
vened, however, because two circuits engaged in open revolt against their
responsibility to serve as gatekeepers ensuring the reliability of expert testi-
mony in toxic torts cases.
First, the Third Circuit, the most lenient circuit pre-Daubert with regard
to the admissibility of expert testimony in toxic tort cases,108 announced that
henceforth it would provide a “hard look,” i.e., “more stringent review” of
district court rulings excluding plaintiffs’ causation evidence.109  Otherwise,
the court claimed, “there is a significant risk that district judges will set the
threshold too high and will in fact force plaintiffs to prove their case twice.
Reducing this risk is particularly important because the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence display a preference for admissibility.”110
The idea that appellate courts should adopt a “hard look” perspective
regarding district court decisions, and only when the district court excluded
evidence, and only when such exclusions applied to plaintiff’s evidence in a
civil case, had no basis in the text of Daubert.  Nor did the court cite any
precedent for the idea that district court evidentiary rulings should be
reviewed differently depending on which side’s evidence was excluded.
Moreover, the court failed to apply any sort of reliability test to the evidence
at hand.
Similarly, in Joiner v. General Electric Co., the Eleventh Circuit not only
reversed a district court decision excluding dubious causation evidence, but
also joined the Third Circuit in applying “a particularly stringent standard of
review to the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony.”111 Joiner involved
an electrician, Robert Joiner, who developed small cell lung cancer after
being exposed to poly-chlorinated biophenyls (PCBs) at his workplace.  He
sued several manufacturers of PCBs, relying on expert testimony regarding
causation that was based on extrapolating from animal studies.  The district
court found that the studies on which the plaintiffs’ experts relied did not
(emphasizing that a district court is “both authorized and obligated to scrutinize carefully
the reasoning and methodology underlying” the expert’s proffered testimony).
106 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 1995).
107 See Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 235, 237–38 (7th Cir. 1996).
108 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 856–59 (3d Cir. 1990); DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954–57 (3d Cir. 1990); Linkstrom v. Golden T.
Farms, 883 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1989). See generally Bernstein, supra note 67, at 152 n.208
(identifying the Third Circuit as having the most liberal admissibility standards for expert
testimony in toxic tort cases of any federal circuit).
109 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749–50 (3d Cir. 1994).
110 Id. at 750.
111 Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e apply a particu-
larly stringent standard of review to the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony.”), rev’d,
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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adequately support the conclusion that PCBs can promote cancers.  The
court then granted summary judgment to the defendants.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in its “particularly stringent
review” of the district court ruling.  The panel concluded that the lower court
erred by “assess[ing] only a portion of the studies relied upon by each of the
Joiners’ experts, and then exclud[ing] the testimony because it drew differ-
ent conclusions from the research than did each of the experts.”112
The gauntlet thrown down, the Supreme Court agreed to review the
Eleventh Circuit holding.  The Court summarily rejected the notion that a
special, stricter standard of review applied to a district court’s exclusion of
plaintiffs’ evidence in toxic tort cases.113  Instead, the Court held that circuit
courts must universally apply an abuse of discretion standard to district court
rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony.114
The Court then took the opportunity to weigh in on the broader contro-
versy within the federal courts regarding whether Daubert permitted district
courts to assess the reliability of an expert’s reasoning process, or whether
courts were to strictly segregate “methodology” from “conclusion.” Joiner
took the former position, stating that “conclusions and methodology are not
entirely distinct from one another” and that nothing in “Daubert or the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”115
Instead, courts were free to conclude that “there is simply too great an analyt-
ical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”116  The Court then
carefully reviewed the plaintiff’s causation testimony, and upheld the district
court’s ruling that the evidence was not admissible.117
Joiner sent a powerful signal to lower federal courts that the era of specu-
lative expert testimony on causation was over.118  The Supreme Court had
112 Id. at 533.
113 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 146.
116 Id.
117 The Court, for example, explained why the animal studies presented in the case
were inadmissible:
Joiner was an adult human being whose alleged exposure to PCB’s was far less
than the exposure in the animal studies.  The PCB’s were injected into the mice
in a highly concentrated form.  The fluid with which Joiner had come into con-
tact generally had a much smaller PCB concentration of between 0-to-500 parts
per million.  The cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic adenomas;
Joiner had developed small-cell carcinomas.  No study demonstrated that adult
mice developed cancer after being exposed to PCB’s.  One of the experts admit-
ted that no study had demonstrated that PCB’s lead to cancer in any other
species.
Id. at 144.
118 See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice:
Unmaking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 263 (2005) (reporting that “the Joiner Court
endorsed an approach that provided trial courts with a template for excluding expert testi-
mony on causation”).  For example, the Eleventh Circuit, which had issued the “loose scru-
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bluntly rejected the let-it-all-in approach in Daubert.  Now, in Joiner, it also
rejected the somewhat more demanding Ferebee approach of allowing quali-
fied experts in cases involving scientific controversies on which no profes-
sional consensus had developed to testify to causation based on ambiguous,
speculative, or preliminary data created with standard scientific
methodologies.
At this point, at least one prominent advocate of more lenient scrutiny
of expert testimony in toxic torts cases conceded defeat.119  Some courts
inclined to more liberal admissibility rules, however, did not give up.  The
Second Circuit, for example, tried to revive Ferebee-like standards in Zuchowicz
v. United States.120  The court upheld the district court’s admission of expert
causation evidence that at best amounted to educated guesses.121  The court
concluded that when direct studies of the association in humans between a
rare disease and a drug are not possible, Joiner allows causation testimony
based on the exclusion of other drugs as the cause and an untested, specula-
tive theory as to how the drug might have produced the disease.122
Arguably, Zuchowicz violated only the spirit, but not the letter, of Joiner.
Joiner permitted and encouraged, but did not explicitly require, a district
court to examine the reliability of an expert’s reasoning processes.123  In the
tiny” lower court opinion in Joiner, issued a much stricter ruling in Allison v. McGhan
Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1314–15 & n.16 (11th Cir. 1999).  After Joiner, courts became
increasingly likely to reject anecdotal case reports as evidence of causation. See, e.g., Hol-
lander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1235–39 (W.D. Okla. 2000); Glastetter
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1030 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d, 252 F.3d 986
(8th Cir. 2001); Brumbaugh v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (D. Mont.
1999); In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227–28 (D. Colo. 1998) (“To the
extent that there are case or anecdotal reports noting various symptoms or signs in breast
implanted women, without controls, these suggest only a potential, untested hypothesis
that breast implants may be their cause.”); Willert v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 995 F. Supp. 979,
981 (D. Minn. 1998) (concluding that case reports are not sufficient evidence of causation
because they do not exclude other alternative explanations).  Other courts rejected chemi-
cal structure analysis as evidence of causation. See, e.g., Schudel v. Gen. Elec. Co., 120 F.3d
991, 996–98 (9th Cir. 1997); Brumbaugh, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1157; see also Daniel J. Capra,
The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 715 (1998) (“One example of improper extrapola-
tion is an expert’s use of structure analysis.”).  For post-Joiner cases rejecting reliance on
government regulatory action to prove causation, see Hollander, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1234 n.9;
Glastetter, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
119 See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 771 (1998).  Gottesman represented the plaintiffs in
Joiner and Daubert before the Supreme Court.
120 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998).
121 See Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A
Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 184 (2003) (describing the expert opin-
ions in Zuchowicz as educated guesses).
122 Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 387.
123 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“But nothing in either
Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evi-
dence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A court may
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absence of such an explicit requirement, the Second Circuit could plausibly
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.124
By contrast to Zuchowicz, in Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc.,125 the Fifth
Circuit held that a party proffering expert testimony must demonstrate that
the expert’s findings and conclusions are based on the scientific method,
and, therefore, are reliable.  This, said the court, requires some “objective,
independent validation of the expert’s methodology.  The expert’s assur-
ances that he has utilized generally accepted scientific methodology is
insufficient.”126
Moore reflected the trend in federal courts far more than Zuchowicz.127
Nevertheless, given precedents like the latter, it remained unclear as to
whether the extant rule was that expert scientific testimony was only admissi-
ble if it was supported by objective validation (which would imply that adver-
sarial bias was the underlying problem addressed by Daubert and Joiner), or
whether district courts could choose between applying that standard and
allowing experts to speculate based on available data (which would imply that
the Court was focused solely on the “junk science” problem).
This ambiguity was addressed in the Supreme Court’s final contribution
to the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.128  Some courts had tried
to evade the trend toward stricter scrutiny of expert testimony by declaring
that Daubert’s reliability standard only applied to scientific evidence.  They
then defined the scope of scientific evidence narrowly.129
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.” (emphasis added)).
124 See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 1999) (allowing
causation testimony even though there were no peer-reviewed studies, no animal studies,
and no laboratory data supporting the testimony); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d
146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) (allowing highly speculative expert testimony not supported by
underlying research because otherwise the rules of evidence would “doom” claims where
the relevant research was in its early stages); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226,
1231 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing a district court’s exclusion of testimony purported to link a
consumer product to lupus, despite the absence of any human or animal studies showing
such a link).
125 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
126 Id. at 276.
127 This led one plaintiffs’ lawyer, not shy about hyperbole, to conclude in 1999 that
“Daubert is death and disaster to Plaintiffs’ attorneys!”  Raphael Metzger, Dealing with
Daubert in California: The Perspective of a Plaintiff’s Attorney, METZGER LAW GROUP http://
www.toxictorts.com/index.php/about-us/articles/40-dealing-with-daubert-in-california-
the-perspective-of-a-plaintiffs-attorney (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
128 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
129 See Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. Cnty. of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1994);
Fanning v. Acromed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D.
158, 168–69, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Thornton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 575, 577–78
(D.S.C. 1997); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 92, at 2273 (“To be sure, it is understanda-
ble why the Daubert Court limited its ruling to scientific testimony.”); Linda Sandstrom
Simard & William G. Young, Daubert’s Gatekeeper: The Role of the District Judge in Admitting
Expert Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1466 n.63 (1994) (noting the narrow scope of Rule
703).  This continues to be an issue in state courts that follow the Frye rule.  The Kansas
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In Kumho Tire, however, the Court extended Daubert’s gatekeeping func-
tion beyond scientific evidence to encompass all expert testimony.  It is diffi-
cult to overstate the significance of this ruling.  As noted previously,130
before Daubert, the Frye general acceptance test was the main tool courts had
to exclude unreliable expert testimony.  But Frye had traditionally applied
only to limited categories of scientific expert testimony, with all other expert
testimony subject to a liberal admissibility standard that focused primarily on
the qualifications of the expert.  By contrast, Kumho Tire expanded Daubert’s
reliability test to the broader universe of expert testimony.
Any claims that this broadening was accompanied by a subtle liberaliza-
tion of the standard for admissibility were negated a year later, when the
Supreme Court noted that “[s]ince Daubert  . . .  parties relying on expert
evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence
must meet.”131
A 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reinforced, indeed
codified, the Supreme Court’s insistence that all adversarial expert testimony
be subject to a reliability test.  In 1997, legislation codifying Daubert was pend-
ing in the federal House of Representatives and Senate.  The legislation was
introduced by congressmen seeking to encourage the trend toward greater
scrutiny of expert testimony.  The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
found the bills to be too narrow, as they did not address non-scientific evi-
dence, and too stringent, as they would “impose evidentiary standards so rig-
orous as to render much traditionally accepted expert testimony
inadmissible.”132  The Advisory Committee therefore decided to try to
amend Rule 702 through the rule-making process.133
The proposed rule had to be demanding enough to discourage congres-
sional efforts to rewrite Rule 702.  Crucially, the new rule mandated that for
expert testimony to be admissible, an expert witness must not only utilize
reliable principles and methods, but must have “applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.”134  The rule therefore prohibited
Supreme Court, for example, held that a physician’s testimony claiming that ingestion of
the drug Parlodel caused a woman’s death was exempt from Frye because it was not based
on scientific evidence but was instead his “pure opinion.”  Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp.,
14 P.3d 1170, 1179–85 (Kan. 2000).
130 See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. R
131 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000) (emphasis added).
132 Memorandum from Fern M. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 4 (Dec.
1, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/
EV12-1997.pdf.
133 See id.
134 Memorandum from Fern M. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 8 (May
1, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/
EV5-1998.pdf.
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experts from relying on informed speculation and educated guesses as in
Zuchowicz.135
The Advisory Committee cut off an additional loophole used by courts
seeking to evade their gatekeeping responsibilities.  Some courts had simply
declared that testimony that otherwise appeared to be expert testimony sub-
ject to the Daubert trilogy could instead be admitted as lay opinion testimony
under Rule 701.136  Rule 701 was therefore amended to clarify that it applied
only to testimony “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”137
Thus, in a very short period of time, expert evidence law in federal
courts (and states following the federal lead) underwent revolutionary
changes.  As of the early 1980s, with few exceptions, any qualified expert was
permitted to testify on any relevant subject.  By 2000, even the most qualified
experts needed to prove that their testimony was based on reliable principles
and methods, and those principles and methods were applied reliably to the
facts of the case.  Prompted by the controversy over toxic tort cases, the law
had evolved very quickly to tackle the longstanding problem of adversarial
bias.  As discussed below, however, not all federal judges accepted such rapid
and radical change.
III. THE COUNTERREVOLUTION
As we have seen, as the rules for expert testimony gradually tightened,
many federal courts resisted.  A few sought to retain the old let-it-all-in rules,
while a larger number preferred narrow changes to deal with obvious
instances of junk science.  Most courts, regardless of their previous positions,
eventually complied with the new order created by the Daubert trilogy as codi-
fied by amended Rule 702.138  Some judges, however, have continued to
apply more liberal rules.  Such judges often rely on cases preceding the 2000
135 Cf. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (overturn-
ing a trial court admissibility ruling and jury verdict on this basis).
136 See, e.g., Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1194 (3d Cir.
1995) (noting the district court’s use of Rule 701 to admit arguably expert testimony).
137 FED. R. EVID. 701(c).
138 For example, several courts excluded causation evidence in cases alleging harm
from the drug Parlodel. See, e.g., Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434,
572–75 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Dunn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676–84
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048–53 (S.D. Ill.
2001); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1351–74 (N.D. Ga. 2001),
aff’d sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002); Glastet-
ter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017–46 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d, 252
F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2001); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233–39
(W.D. Okla. 2000), aff’d, 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002). But see Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm.
Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (denying motion for summary judg-
ment on grounds that expert testimony was reliable); Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP
98-1429-C-Y/S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *55–88 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2001); Globetti v.
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (N.D. Ala. 2000).  Such evidence would
have been easily admissible in an earlier era.
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changes to Rule 702, going back at times to pre-Joiner, or even pre-Daubert
case law inconsistent with later developments in the law of expert testimony.
Meanwhile, they ignore the language of Rule 702.139
Judging from the opinions they wrote, some federal judges were either
unaware that Rule 702 was amended in 2000, or intentionally ignored the
amendment.140  Other judges have ignored both Joiner’s statement that  dis-
trict courts may reject testimony when there is an “analytical gap”141 between
the expert’s methodology and conclusions, and amended Rule 702’s insis-
139 For discussions of this issue, see David Bernstein, Courts Refusing to Apply Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 6, 2006, 09:29 AM), http://www.volokh.
com/posts/chain_1147021015.shtml; David Bernstein, More on Daubert and Rule 702, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jul. 6, 2006, 3:38 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/
1152214719.shtml.  Perhaps the most egregious example of a federal appellate court ignor-
ing the language of Rule 702 arose in the 2006 Federal Circuit opinion in Liquid Dynamics
Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  In this case, the court never cited the
text of Rule 702, or, for that matter, showed an awareness that Rule 702, as amended in
2000, is the governing rule for the admissibility of expert testimony.  The court cited
Daubert as the last word on the scope of Rule 702, ignoring both the text of amended Rule
702 and Joiner. Id. at 1220.  To justify its ruling, the court cited a 1986(!) Eighth Circuit
opinion for the proposition that inadequacies in expert testimony are a matter of weight,
not admissibility. Id. at 1221.  The court also cited an equally wrongheaded post-2000 Elev-
enth Circuit opinion that relied on the same 1986 precedent to state that an objection to
the reliability of an expert’s testimony goes only to weight, not admissibility. Id.  For a
recent example of a court relying on pro-admissibility dicta in Daubert and ignoring subse-
quent developments, see MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Patriarch Partners VIII, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 3255,
2012 WL 2568972, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence favor the
admissibility of expert testimony and are applied with a ‘liberal thrust.’” (quoting Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993))).
As courts have noted, “‘Rule 702 reflects an attempt to liberalize the rules governing
the admission of expert testimony.’”  Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 523 (8th Cir. 1999)).  It is
remarkable that a federal court in 2001 could come to the conclusion that Rule 702 liberal-
ized the admissibility of expert testimony, and even more remarkable that the court quotes
for support an opinion from when a different version of the rule existed.  To compound
matters, it also quoted a pre-Daubert opinion for the proposition that Rule 702 is a rule “‘of
admissibility rather than exclusion.’” Id. (quoting Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235,
1239 (8th Cir. 1991)).
140 At least two federal district court judges have alluded to the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of Rule 702 in the Daubert trilogy as the current law.  Of course, the trilogy inter-
preted the old Rule 702, and neither of the judges in question addressed the text of the
current rule. See In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279
(N.D. Ala. 2012); Ellipsis, Inc. v. The Color Works, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 752, 757 (W.D.
Tenn. 2006).  In another recent case, the presiding judge invoked the Third Circuit
approach to expert testimony. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 2007–MD–1871, 2011 WL 13576, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011).  While the judge did
quote the language of the current rule, she added that in a 1999 case, the Third Circuit
distilled this rule to two essential inquiries: “1) is the proffered expert qualified to express
an expert opinion; and 2) is the expert opinion reliable?” Id. at *1 (quoting In re TMI
Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 664 (3d Cir. 1999)).  The Third Circuit obviously could not have
distilled a rule from statutory language that did not yet exist.
141 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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tence that courts ensure that a witness has applied the principles and meth-
ods reliably to the facts of the case.142  Yet others have been far more lenient
about admitting expert testimony than any reasonable interpretation of Rule
702 would allow.143  Finally, some courts resurrected the ghost of Ferebee by
holding plaintiffs’ evidence to a lower standard of reliability when no scien-
tific consensus on the issue at hand had developed.144
142 For example, in 2004 the Eleventh Circuit cautioned that “a court should meticu-
lously focus on the expert’s principles and methodology, and not on the conclusions that
they generate.”  McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004).  In another
2004 opinion, the Eleventh Circuit quoted the three-part test established by Rule 702, but
just a few paragraphs later announced that its own more forgiving test, adopted in 1998,
was the law of the circuit. See United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)); cf.
Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 682 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012) (Tjoflat, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the Frazier test must be construed
to mean the same thing as Rule 702).  The Third Circuit, meanwhile, claimed that “the
role of the District Court is simply to evaluate whether the methodology utilized by the
expert is reliable” and added that any “application” of the methodology should be
“addressed on cross-examination,” not through the rules of evidence.  Walker v. Gordon,
46 F. App’x 691, 695–96 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Riley v. Target Corp., No. 4:05CV00729,
2006 WL 1028773, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 13, 2006) (holding that any flaws in a “differen-
tial diagnosis” go to weight, not admissibility).
143 See, e.g., Kudabeck v. Kroger Co., 338 F.3d 856, 860–63 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
chiropractor’s testimony that a fall caused the plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease satisfied
Daubert); Perkins v. Origin Medsystems, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 45, 62 (D. Conn. 2004) (con-
cluding that a clinician’s speculation based on her experience, and not an examination of
the victim, was admissible); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 1230, 1248 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“[C]ase and adverse drug reports, textbooks and
treatises, and the clinical experience of several experts . . . satisfies the mandate of
Daubert.”).
144 The Eighth Circuit, in language reminiscent of Ferebee, has stated that
[t]he first several victims of a new toxic tort should not be barred from having
their day in court simply because the medical literature, which will eventually
show the connection between the victims’ condition and the toxic substance
[(how could a court possibly know this?)], has not yet been completed.
Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2001) (first alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d
1202, 1209 (8th Cir. 2000)).  By contrast, in Daubert, the Supreme Court stated:
We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how
flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations.  That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules
of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but
for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
The Eighth Circuit added that:
the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not
the admissibility, and it is up to the opposing party to examine the factual basis
for the opinion in cross-examination.  Only if the expert’s opinion is so funda-
mentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury must such testi-
mony be excluded.
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The most notorious opinion rebelling against the post-Daubert admissi-
bility rules for expert testimony, the First Circuit’s opinion in Milward v. Acu-
ity Specialty Products Group, Inc.,145 makes all of these errors and more.
Milward involved claims that Brian Milward’s workplace exposure to products
containing benzene caused him to develop a rare subtype of acute myeloid
leukemia (AML) called acute promyelocytic leukemia (APL).146  The plain-
tiffs’ scientific expert was Martyn Smith, a well-credentialed toxicologist with
much experience researching the health effects of benzene.147
At defendants’ request, the trial court bifurcated the trial so that the
issues of general and specific causation would be presented separately.  Smith
first presented evidence on general causation, i.e., whether benzene expo-
sure causes an increased risk of APL.  Smith argued that causation could be
inferred based on the following evidence:
(1) a small body of epidemiological studies investigating the relationship
between benzene exposure and AML;
(2) an analogy between APL and other types of AML known to be associ-
ated with benzene exposure;
(3) experimental research purporting to show that the various sub-types
of AML have a common pathology; and
(4) toxicological studies of the effect of benzene exposure on human
chromosomes, in particular the inhibition on topoisomerase II enzyme.148
Smith argued that considering this evidence as a whole, the “weight of
the evidence” demonstrated that benzene could cause APL.149  His testimony
was supported by the testimony of a philosopher, Carl Cranor, who endorsed
Smith’s weight of the evidence approach as a valid and appropriate scientific
methodology.150
The defendants’ experts acknowledged that scientific and medical evi-
dence supports the notion that benzene can cause AML.  However, the
defendants’ experts also noted that there are differences between various
AML subtypes, and argued that it was inappropriate to surmise that benzene
Bonner, 259 F.3d at 929–30 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hose v. Chicago
Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1995)).  This was not a correct statement of the
law even in 1996, much less after Rule 702 was amended in 2000. See also In re Celexa &
Lexapro Prods. Liab. Litig., 927 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (“‘The exclusion of
an expert’s opinion is proper only if it is so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no
assistance to the jury.’” (quoting Wood v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 112 F.3d 306, 309 (8th
Cir. 1997))).
145 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Milward, 132 S.
Ct. 1002 (2012).
146 Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140 (D. Mass.
2009), rev’d, 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Milward,
132 S.Ct. 1002 (2012).
147 See id. at 142.
148 Id. at 142–44.
149 Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 Milward, 639 F.3d at 17–18.
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can cause APL just because it can cause AML.151  One of the defendants’
experts, epidemiologist David Garabrant, pointed out numerous weaknesses
and flaws in the epidemiological evidence Smith relied upon, both in the
studies themselves and in the idiosyncratic ways that Smith interpreted
them.152
In a careful and detailed opinion, district court Judge George A.
O’Toole, Jr. held that Milward’s general causation evidence failed Rule 702,
and was therefore inadmissible.153  O’Toole found that Smith had relied on
epidemiological studies that did not in fact support his conclusion.  Moreo-
ver, the court noted that none of these studies were statistically significant,
which O’Toole concluded rendered any reliance upon them scientifically
dubious.154  O’Toole was equally unimpressed with Smith’s other evidence,
finding that at best they constituted “plausible hypotheses,” not scientific
knowledge, and therefore were not reliable support for a scientific conclu-
sion that benzene causes APL.  O’Toole then granted summary judgment to
the defendants.155
The plaintiff appealed.  The prospects did not look promising, as the
First Circuit was faced with the following question: Did a district court judge
abuse his discretion when (a) the judge excluded causation testimony by an
expert who relied on his “judgment” in extrapolating from studies that do
not themselves state that causation exists; (b) the judge, after reviewing sev-
eral days of testimony from both sides along with written submissions, care-
fully analyzed the studies underlying the plaintiffs’ experts’ causation
testimony and found that at most they support a working hypothesis and can-
not be the basis of reliable testimony;156 and (c) the appellate court acknowl-
edges that the doubts raised by the district court were “sensible” ones?157
The answer under the Daubert trilogy as codified in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 would seem clearly to be “no.”  The First Circuit nevertheless held
that the district court abused its discretion, and ordered the evidence admit-
ted on remand.158  In explaining its reasoning, the appellate court engaged
in many of the errors and fallacies common to judges who continue to resist
the Daubert revolution.
151 Milward, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
152 Id. at 148–49.
153 Id. at 140.
154 Id. at 149.
155 Id. at 145–49.
156 A supporter of the Milward appellate opinion notes: “It is not every day, after all,
that a district judge—who wrote an opinion that cited the correct binding precedent,
addressed each of the factors recited in the precedential opinion being followed, and sup-
ported it all with citations to the record—is reversed for abuse of discretion.”  Steve C.
Gold, A Fitting Vision of Science for the Courtroom, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2013).
157 Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied sub nom. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Milward, 132 S. Ct. 1002 (2012).
158 Id. at 26.
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A. Ignoring Rule 702
As the Supreme Court pointedly emphasized in Daubert, the Federal
Rules of Evidence are interpreted like any other statute.159  The first step in
interpreting any statute is to start with the statutory language.
Milward quoted the text of amended Rule 702,160 but then proceeded to
ignore it in analyzing the admissibility of plaintiffs’ expert testimony.161
Instead, the court contended that “the alleged flaws identified by the court
go to the weight of Dr. Smith’s opinion, not its admissibility.”162  The court
added, “ ‘When the factual underpinning of an expert’s opinion is weak, it is
a matter affecting the weight and credibility of the testimony—a question to
be resolved by the jury.’”163  This is a rather extraordinary statement given
that Rule 702 not only invites but demands that district courts reject expert
testimony that is not based on “sufficient facts or data,” or is not the product
of “reliable principles and methods,” or when the witness has not “applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”164  Given that
the First Circuit acknowledged that the doubts raised by the district court
judge about Smith’s testimony were “sensible,”165 the district court’s ruling
was not an abuse of discretion.
B. Relying on Obsolete Precedents
Instead of grappling with the text of Rule 702, Milward quoted a post-
2000 First Circuit opinion, United States v. Vargas, for the proposition that
“‘weak’” expert testimony is for the jury alone to sort out.166  While Rule 702
may not exclude all weak expert testimony, surely the rule requires at least
that a court explain why such testimony is nevertheless sufficiently reliable to
be admitted. Vargas avoided this issue by neglecting not just the text of
amended Rule 702, but also Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire.  Instead, Vargas
159 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (citing Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)).
160 Milward, 639 F.3d at 15.
161 See Nathan A. Schachtman, WOE-fully Inadequate Methodology—An Ipse Dixit by Another
Name, SCHACHTMANLAW.COM (May 1, 2012, 5:03 AM), http://schachtmanlaw.com/woe-ful-
inadequate-methodology-an-ipse-dixit-by-another-name (suggesting that Milward “threat-
ens to read an Act of Congress—the Federal Rules of Evidence, and especially Rules 702
and 703—out of existence by judicial fiat”).
162 Milward, 639 F.3d at 22.
163 Id. (quoting United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 2006)).
164 FED. R. EVID. 702; cf. Joe¨lle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry Becomes an
(Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 11 n.48 (2004) (criticizing another
federal court for redefining the “reliability of an expert’s application of his methods to the
facts, which should fall squarely within the judge’s purview, as a question of ‘persuasive-
ness,’” which goes only to weight).
165 Milward, 639 F.3d at 23.
166 Vargas, 471 F.3d at 264 (quoting Int’l Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Emerson Int’l,
Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 545 (1st Cir. 1988)).
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favorably quoted a case from 1988, a time when federal courts applied admis-
sibility standards far more forgiving than Rule 702’s.167
Milward also suggested on two occasions that Smith’s testimony was
admissible because, as required by Kumho Tire, he used the “same level of
intellectual rigor” in preparing his testimony as he and others do outside of
legal proceedings.168 Kumho Tire, however, also requires the trial judge to
“determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of [the relevant] discipline.”169  The opinion also emphasizes
that appellate courts must respect the district court’s “discretionary author-
ity . . . to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circum-
stances of the particular case.”170 Kumho Tire therefore cannot be relied
upon to justify a circuit court ruling invalidating a careful district court relia-
bility ruling simply because the higher court decided that the same intellec-
tual rigor standard was met.
Regardless, Rule 702, which was drafted before Kumho Tire was issued,
does not adopt the same intellectual rigor as the test for the admissibility of
expert testimony.  Rule 702 ultimately requires that the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.  So if an expert
scientist, using all the intellectual rigor he can muster, relies on unreliable
speculation and hypothesis, his testimony is not admissible under Rule
702.171
Finally, the same intellectual rigor test seems inapposite to Smith’s testi-
mony.  Smith is a toxicologist with no expertise in epidemiology or biostatis-
tics, yet he relied on his own idiosyncratic interpretation of relevant
epidemiologic studies.  The only epidemiologist to testify, Garabrant,
explained that Smith had relied upon some studies that suggested no associa-
tion and others that had flaws in their statistical analyses.  Garabrant also
stated that Smith improperly manipulated the data in some studies, speculat-
ing that illnesses identified in the study as AML could have been APL.  Nor
did Smith, who relied only on epidemiological studies that lacked statistical
significance, do what a statistical expert would likely do in such circum-
stances: utilize advanced statistical techniques (i.e., meta-analysis) to try to
tease a statistically significant result out of the aggregated data.
167 Id.
168 Milward, 639 F.3d at 15, 19, 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
170 Id. at 158.
171 See Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002); Goebel v. Denver
& Rio Grande W.R.R., 215 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2000) (“It is axiomatic that an expert,
no matter how good his credentials, is not permitted to speculate.”); David L. Faigman, The
Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven
of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 667 (2000) (pointing out that relying on the
“same intellectual rigor” does not ensure that testimony meets the reliability test).  The
expert may be forced to rely on speculation because there is insufficient data to support his
conclusion, or because there might be sufficient data but the expert’s reasoning process is
invalid.  I thank David Kaye for that point.
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Even if one chose not to credit Garabrand’s testimony, the plaintiffs’
reply brief in the First Circuit acknowledged that Smith had made an “embar-
rassing” mistake in analyzing the data in one of the studies he relied on.172
In such circumstances, the First Circuit erred in concluding that Smith so
clearly used the same intellectual rigor as experts would outside of court-
room testimony that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
Smith’s testimony.
C. Ignoring Joiner
The First Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
because it failed to give adequate deference to the weight of the evidence
methodology employed by Smith:
The court treated the separate evidentiary components of Dr. Smith’s analy-
sis atomistically, as though his ultimate opinion was independently supported
by each. . . . [But in Smith’s] weight of the evidence approach, no body of
evidence was itself treated as justifying an inference of causation.  Rather,
each body of evidence was treated as grounds for the subsidiary conclusion
that it would, if combined with other evidence, support a causal
inference.173
The broader theoretical problems with deferring to causation experts
purporting to rely on the weight of the evidence will be discussed later.174
For now, however, it is sufficient to point out that the court’s holding on this
issue—that a district court abuses its discretion when it (a) considers each
piece of causation evidence individually rather than holistically; and (b)
rejects an expert’s speculative weight of the evidence testimony—is in direct
conflict with General Electric Co. v. Joiner.175
172 Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 24–26, Milward, 639 F.3d 11 (No. 09-2270).
173 Milward, 639 F.3d at 23.
174 See infra notes 200–210 and accompanying text.
175 522 U.S. 136, 146–47 (1997).  By contrast, Milward is completely consistent with
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Joiner. Stevens wrote:
Joiner’s experts used a “weight of the evidence” methodology to assess whether
Joiner’s exposure to transformer fluids promoted his lung cancer.  They did not
suggest that any one study provided adequate support for their conclusions, but
instead relied on all the studies taken together (along with their interviews of
Joiner and their review of his medical records).  The District Court, however,
examined the studies one by one and concluded that none was sufficient to show
a link between PCB’s and lung cancer. . . . Unlike the District Court, the Court of
Appeals expressly decided that a “weight of the evidence” methodology was scien-
tifically acceptable.  To this extent, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is persuasive.  It
is not intrinsically “unscientific” for experienced professionals to arrive at a con-
clusion by weighing all available scientific evidence—this is not the sort of “junk
science” with which Daubert was concerned.
Id. at 152–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).  Stevens concluded that the
Eleventh Circuit had been correct in finding that the district court had abused its discre-
tion in excluding this evidence. Id. at 155.  But Stevens spoke only for himself.  The rest of
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The Supreme Court examined Joiner’s experts’ evidence in exactly the
way the Milward court said was forbidden, that is, by “atomistically”176 look-
ing at each study relied on by the experts to see if it could support causation
testimony.177  Indeed, even the late Professor Margaret Berger, who wrote an
introduction to the third edition of the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence that strongly favors liberal admissibility standards
in toxic torts cases,178 acknowledges that under Joiner a “trial judge[ ] . . . is
free to choose an atomistic approach that evaluates the available studies one
by one.”179
Milward utterly fails to explain how its holding is consistent with
Joiner.180  Milward’s expert on scientific methodology, Carl Cranor, wrote
after the case that Milward corrected the Supreme Court’s “atomistic” error
in Joiner.181  Needless to say, circuit court judges do not have the authority to
correct Supreme Court holdings.
Even if Milward is correct that sound practice dictates considering the
evidence a plaintiff’s expert is relying on to infer causation holistically,182
and even if there were some way to evade Joiner, the proper remedy in Mil-
ward would have been to remand the case to the district court to reconsider
based on the standard mandated by the circuit.  The district court, after all,
had not only entertained extensive briefing and heard several days of viva
voce testimony at a hearing, but on remand could ask for supplemental brief-
the Justices disagreed that the district court was obligated to admit weight of the evidence
testimony.
176 Milward, 639 F.3d at 23.
177 See Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1341 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The fact that the
district court then further analyzed each article in detail and found each to be unreliable
was a proper approach to the issue.” (citing Joiner, 552 U.S. at 145–46)).
178 See Margaret A. Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 11, 36 (3d ed. 2011).
179 Id. at 23.
180 There is some debate in academic circles as to whether Rule 702 clarifies, codifies,
or supersedes Joiner, but no one argues that Joiner is more stringent than Rule 702.
181 Cranor, supra note 18. R
182 See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DIETARY SUPPLE-
MENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SAFETY 255–60 (2005); Susan Haack, Proving Causa-
tion: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 253
(2008); Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr.
Joiner, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 217, 223–24, 237 (2001). But see Merck & Co. v. Garza,
347 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex. 2011) (“The totality of the evidence cannot prove general causa-
tion if it does not meet the standards for scientific reliability . . . . A plaintiff cannot prove
causation by presenting different types of unreliable evidence.”).  A “holistic” approach to
an expert only works if the expert is reasonably relying on the facts and data in the studies
in question, an issue addressed by Federal Rule of Evidence 703.  In this author’s view, a
“holistic” review of the evidence would rarely make a difference if courts properly apply the
reliability standard.
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ing on whether and why reviewing plaintiffs’ expert evidence holistically
should change the judgment that the testimony was not reliable.183
D. Reducing the Burden of Persuasion When the Defendants Lack Strong
Contrary Evidence
The First Circuit distinguished its Milward opinion from cases “in which
the available epidemiological studies found that there is no causal link.”184
This mimics the pre-Daubert Ferebee standard, discussed above.185  The Ferebee
standard has no basis in the Daubert trilogy and Rule 702.  The plaintiff under
Rule 702 has the burden of showing that his expert testimony is reliable, not
that the expert did the “best [he] could with the available data and the scien-
tific literature.”186  Nothing in the Daubert trilogy or Rule 702 suggests that
the plaintiff’s burden is lessened simply because the issue is on the frontier of
medical knowledge or because strong contrary evidence has not been
presented by the defendant.  Indeed, as pointed out previously,187 Rule 702
and Joiner utterly rejected Ferebee-like standards.188
E. Misunderstanding the Underlying Rationale for Modern Admissibility Rules
Like many courts before it, and like Justice Stevens’s lone dissent in
Joiner, the First Circuit in Milward seemed to think that the only purpose of
federal courts’ gatekeeper function is to exclude obvious junk science from
the courts, while still allowing well-credentialed scientists to speculate based
on incomplete data.189  Relying on the testimony of Professor Cranor, the
183 “Reversal is warranted only when the case for causation is so clear that exclusion of
the evidence, viewing the expert’s reasoning as a whole, is an abuse of discretion—a situa-
tion that is not obvious [in Milward].” KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 10.5.1. R
184 Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 24 (citing Norris v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005)); Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d
194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996)).
185 See supra notes 50–67 and accompanying text.
186 Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1213 (10th Cir. 2002); see also
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (stating that
Rule 702 does not establish a “best efforts test” (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d
sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002).
187 See supra notes 175–85 and accompanying text. R
188 In contrast to Milward, the Sixth Circuit recently quoted the language of Rule 702 in
ordering the exclusion of causation testimony on the grounds that the plaintiff’s experts
presented only “a plausible hypothesis.”  Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 670
(6th Cir. 2010).  Such a hypothesis, the court explained, “is not knowledge, nor is it based
upon sufficient facts or data or the product of reliable principles and methods . . .
applied . . . reliably to the facts of the case.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
189 Not surprisingly, academic commentators writing in support of Milward make the
same supposition. See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Regulatory Science in
Rulemaking and Tort: Unifying the Weight of the Evidence Approach, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
65, 99 (2013) (“Daubert was essentially concerned with excluding expert witnesses who
were charlatans—witnesses who would testify in favor of the plaintiff even though the avail-
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court repeatedly emphasized that Smith properly used his “judgment” in rea-
soning to the conclusion that Benzene exposure causes APL.  The court was
correct that practicing scientists extrapolate from uncertain evidence to for-
mulate scientific hypotheses.  But the court was wrong to think that this nec-
essarily amounts to something more than the scientists’ best guess.190
In the regulatory context, where government agencies are charged with
proactively protecting the public health from potential toxic threats, agencies
often have no choice but to rely on scientists’ best guesses in the face of
scientific uncertainty.  But such best guesses are not admissible in toxic tort
cases, where the law demands reliable expert testimony regarding
causation.191
In part, the distinction between the standards for regulatory determina-
tions and the standards for causation determinations in toxic tort cases rests
on the differing contexts.  In the former, agencies seek to protect the public
from potential risks that may turn out to harm public health, while in the
latter the plaintiff has the burden of showing that a particular risk did in fact
cause him harm.  The distinction also turns on the question of adversarial
bias.192  Scientists working for regulatory agencies can be presumed to
able scientific evidence offered little or no support for their testimony.”).  While, as noted
previously, that was at least a plausible interpretation of Daubert, it was rebutted by later
developments in Joiner, Kumho Tire, and amended Rule 702.
190 “Anyone who has been trained in the scientific method realizes that a hypothesis is a
scientist’s educated speculation.”  Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 393 (D. Kan.
1984).
191 Many courts have acknowledged as much. See, e.g., Rider, 295 F.3d at 1201 (“[The]
risk-utility analysis involves a much lower standard than that which is demanded by a court
of law.  A regulatory agency such as the FDA may choose to err on the side of caution.
Courts, however, are required by the Daubert trilogy to engage in objective review of evi-
dence to determine whether it has sufficient . . . basis to be considered reliable.”); Allen v.
Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (“This [weight of the evidence] method-
ology results from the preventive perspective that the agencies adopt in order to reduce
public exposure to harmful substances.  The agencies’ threshold of proof is reasonably
lower than that appropriate in tort law, which traditionally make[s] more particularized
inquiries into cause and effect and requires a plaintiff to prove that it is more likely than
not that another individual has caused him or her harm.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
192 By contrast, two law professors who defend Milward “see no meaningful distinction
between the regulatory and tort contexts.”  McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 189, at 68.  The
authors acknowledge that agencies’ administrators get advice “from scientific advisory com-
mittees and from their in-house scientists” while “the jury or judge has the benefit of testi-
mony from experts presented by the plaintiff and the defendant.” Id. at 98.  But the
authors fail to “see any differences between them that would require screening out testi-
mony in a tort case that relies on a weight of the evidence approach.” Id. at 98–99.  The
authors seem to think that the relevant difference would be in the relative levels of compe-
tence of the respective triers of fact.  But they don’t address the issue of adversarial bias, so
it is not clear why they would think that experts chosen by partisans in litigation to support
a partisan position would be as likely to present reliable testimony based on their pur-
ported scientific judgment as would in-house government scientists and expert advisory
committees.
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represent mainstream opinion in their fields, and to be trying to reach the
best possible result from a public welfare perspective.193  By contrast, given
pervasive adversarial bias in the context of toxic tort litigation, one must pre-
sume that an expert was chosen precisely because the views he is willing to
state in court reflect the position of the party that hired him to testify.194
Federal evidence rules evolved to ultimately demand an objective basis for
opinion testimony to deal with the problems attendant to adversarial bias.195
193 Undoubtedly agencies, especially ones dealing with hot-button political issues, can
be captured by scientists with an agenda.  But unlike with adversarial bias and partisan
experts in litigation, this is not necessarily a systemic problem and there is no reason to
presume it is true in any given situation.
194 In the process of writing this article, the author came across an article by Professor
Michael Green of Wake Forest Law School that makes a very similar point.  He notes that
given the lack of a scientific consensus on benzene and APL we will have the same dueling
adversarial experts, one testifying that using the weight of the evidence methodology leads
her to the conclusion that plaintiff’s disease was caused by defendant’s toxic agent, and the
other testifying to all of the flaws in the evidence relied on by the other expert and why it is
not proper scientific methodology.
Green explains that this is far different than the measured assessments that might
occur among scientists at an International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) meeting
to review the carcinogenicity of an industrial chemical, or an Advisory Committee formed
by the FDA to assess evidence of adverse effects of a recently approved new drug.  Not only
is the selection and preparation of scientists for such proceedings dramatically different
from selecting experts for litigation, the process of consensus advisory committees and the
process of direct and cross examination of expert witnesses in a courtroom is also very
different.  See Michael D. Green, Pessimism About Milward, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 41,
58–59 (2013); see also Sanders, supra note 56, at 74 (“It is the legal system’s commitment to R
adversarialism in the form of party control of expert witnesses that creates substantial pres-
sures on experts to adopt a more party-oriented point of view.”).
Meanwhile, the existence of adversarial bias provides the answer to a question posed
by Professor Steve Gold in his contribution to a symposium on Milward: “Courts give ques-
tions to the jury if reasonable people could find for either side.  Why should disagreement
among scientists be the one sphere of human inquiry in which we do not let a fact-finder
resolve the dispute as applied to a particular set of facts?”  Gold, supra note 158, at 19.
Adversarial bias creates special problems for expert testimony that it does not create for
ordinary witness testimony.  As this author has noted elsewhere:
[L]ay witnesses, unlike experts, are not paid for their testimony, which eliminates
the possibility of serving as a “witness for hire.”  Second, lay witnesses are only
permitted to present opinion testimony based on their own rational perceptions,
limiting the scope of their testimony.  Third, attorneys can shop from an almost
unlimited pool of expert witnesses, while generally a very limited pool of potential
ordinary fact witnesses exists in any given case.  Finally, jurors may be particularly
likely to assume that an expert witness, particularly a scientist, is an unbiased par-
ticipant in the proceedings.
Bernstein, supra note 35, at 455 (footnotes omitted). R
195 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000 Amendments) (“The trial
court’s gatekeeping function requires more than simply ‘taking the expert’s word for it.’”);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We’ve been
presented with only the experts’ qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of
reliability.  Under Daubert, that’s not enough.”).
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This is also why so many courts have emphasized the importance of sound
epidemiological evidence, which provides statistical verification of associa-
tions between exposures and diseases, to causation testimony.196  When an
expert does not have such evidence, and must rely on his judgment (or “best
guess”), the expert should, at the very least under a liberal interpretation of
Rule 702, be able to point to evidence that his judgment is widely shared by
other researchers.
In Milward, the district court noted that Smith’s conclusion lacked gen-
eral acceptance.  On appeal, the First Circuit lamely responded that although
general acceptance is a factor district courts may consider when reviewing
expert testimony, the district court gave this factor “undue weight.”197  The
appellate court, in other words, criticized the district court for looking to the
only objective evidence presented to the court as to whether Smith’s conclu-
sions were backed by more than his idiosyncratic speculation.
F. Allowing “Weight of the Evidence” Testimony in Lieu of Applying the
Reliability Test
As noted above, Milward put great stock in the fact that the plaintiffs’
expert purported to rely on a “weight of the evidence methodology.”  The
court used this phrase as if it denotes a reasoning process that is both scien-
tific and reliable.  In fact, however, it is largely tautological: the act of infer-
ring “B” from “A” while trying to reach the correct conclusion typically
involves using a “weight of the evidence methodology.”198  To allow an
expert to testify simply because he purports to be extrapolating from the
evidence in light of the weight he chooses to give to each item of evidence
would be to leave the evidentiary gates wide open.  Every quack and huckster
claiming that he is relying on an evidentiary mosaic to invent causation with-
196 See, e.g., Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1358 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (“[T]he burden is on Plaintiffs to show that well-conducted epidemiology studies do
show a statistically significant relationship between [the disease and the alleged agent].  It
is not Defendant’s burden to show the lack of such relationship.”), aff’d sub nom. Rider v.
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002); Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347
S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs seeking to prove causation with
epidemiological evidence must produce two independent studies demonstrating that sub-
jects who used the product at issue under circumstances substantially similar to those
encountered by the plaintiff at least doubled their the risk of injury).  Even epidemiologi-
cal evidence must be treated with care. See Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits, 269
SCI. 164, 164–69 (1995) (noting that epidemiology is subject to systematic errors, biases,
and confounders).
197 Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2011).
198 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 18, § 29:6, at 782 (criticizing Milward for confusing
inference with a scientific methodology).  The same could be said of those state courts
which, utilizing the Frye rule, admit testimony because an expert purports to be using the
“extrapolation method.” See, e.g., Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314,
327 (Ill. 2002), abrogated by In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Ill. 2004).
At least in Donaldson, unlike in Milward, the court was not obligated under governing law
to consider the expert’s reasoning process.
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out reference to reliable scientific evidence could claim he is utilizing a
“weight of the evidence methodology.”199
Weight of the evidence language is sometimes used in the risk assess-
ment context to confer credibility on conclusions extrapolated from limited
data.  This has come under withering attack from critics who note that rely-
ing on the weight of the evidence is only scientifically valid when the expert
provides transparent and detailed explanation of exactly how the expert
weighed the evidence.200  As David Kaye and his co-authors write in The New
Wigmore: Expert Evidence, “The nature of the studies in each case, the plausibil-
ity of the extrapolations from them, and the known soundness of the basic
theory—in sum, the expert’s causal reasoning—must be unpacked and
inspected to verify that it is sound science.”201  Otherwise, weight of the evi-
dence is nothing more than a metaphor, not an actual scientific
methodology.202
Indeed, the phrase “weight of the evidence” is so porous and amorphous
that one researcher found that it is used in the scientific literature to mean
no less than thirteen different things.203  By far the most common use “is to
refer to a body of scientific evidence that has been examined for some pur-
ported risk, without reference to any interpretative methodology.”204
Milward correctly cautions that relying on the weight of the evidence is
not “inherently unreliable.”205  The question presented to the First Circuit,
199 See Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. 1986) (dis-
cussing the “mosaic” theory while upholding a jury verdict in favor a plaintiff in a Bendec-
tin case despite voluminous contrary scientific evidence); Green, supra note 194, at 62–63
(recounting the origins of the mosaic metaphor). See generally KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, R
§ 10.5.1 (“In any event, the court’s comments on ‘weight of the evidence’ as a scientific
‘methodology’ must not be read to permit the phrase to become a blank check for admis-
sion.  After all, plaintiffs’ experts in General Electric Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael also were using a weight-of-evidence, best-inference ‘method.’” (footnotes omitted)).
200 See Douglas L. Weed, Weight of Evidence: A Review of Concept and Methods, 25 RISK
ANALYSIS 1545, 1546–51 (2005); see also Virginia H. Dale et al., Enhancing the Ecological Risk
Assessment Process, 4 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 306, 306 (2008) (“An
approach to interpreting lines of evidence and weight of evidence is critically needed for
complex assessments, and it would be useful to develop case studies and/or standards of
practice for interpreting lines of evidence.”); Glenn W. Suter II & Susan M. Cormier, Why
and How to Combine Evidence in Environmental Assessments: Weighing Evidence and Building
Cases, 409 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 1406, 1406 (2011) (noting that “weight of the evidence” evalu-
ations are prone to arbitrariness and subjectivity).
201 KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 10.5.1; see also Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry R
Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 602–08 (D.N.J. 2002) (concluding that an expert’s reliance
on a purported weight of the evidence methodology to find causation was unreliable
because the expert did not explain the weight he gave to the different pieces of evidence),
aff’d, 68 F. App’x 356 (3d Cir. 2003); Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993
A.2d 367, 379 (Vt. 2010) (affirming the exclusion of testimony where the expert did not
specify the weight he had given to each study).
202 Weed, supra note 200, at 1546–47.
203 See id. at 1547.
204 Id. at 1546.
205 Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2011).
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however, was not whether extrapolation from existing data is sometimes
valid.  Rather, it was whether Smith’s testimony met Rule 702’s reliability test,
and whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that it did not.
Milward claims that Smith’s “weight of the evidence” methodology
involved following “the guidelines articulated by world-renowned epidemiol-
ogist Sir Arthur [sic] Bradford Hill in his seminal methodological article on
inferences of causality.”206  But as Hill himself specified, these guidelines
only come into play once scientists have found an “association between two
variables, perfectly clear-cut and beyond what we would care to attribute to
the play of chance.”207  Such evidence will normally come from epidemiolog-
ical studies.208
The defendants’ experts persuaded the district court that the plaintiff’s
expert presented no reliable evidence of even an association between Ben-
zene exposure and APL.  In particular, the district court rejected the epide-
miological evidence presented by the plaintiff’s expert.  Certainly, there was
nothing “perfectly clear cut” about the purported association.
Milward tried to justify its decision by analogizing weight of the evidence
methodology to differential diagnosis.209  But differential diagnosis, as the
case cited in Milward explains, involves “a determination of which of two or
more diseases, presenting with similar symptoms had caused a patient’s ail-
ments.”210  What Smith did is analogous instead to differential etiology, that
is, trying to determine which of several known causes of a disease caused the
subject’s disease.211  A differential etiology, however, “cannot possibly deter-
mine that substance A caused disease B in the absence of prior, reliable inde-
pendent evidence that substance A can cause disease B.”212  Translated into
legal jargon, differential etiologies are only probative of specific causation,
not general causation.213  Just as courts typically exclude differential etiolo-
gies when the expert has not provided sufficient independent evidence that
206 Id. at 17 (citing Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Cau-
sation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295 (1965)).
207 Hill, supra note 206, at 295; see Dunn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672,
680–81 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (elaborating on this point).
208 Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 178, at 549, 599 n.141 (“In a number of cases, experts
attempted to use these guidelines to support the existence of causation in the absence of
any epidemiologic studies finding an association. . . . There may be some logic to that
effort, but it does not reflect accepted epidemiologic methodology.” (citations omitted)).
209 See Milward, 639 F.3d at 18.
210 Granfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 597 F.3d 474, 486 (1st Cir. 2010).
211 See Hill, supra note 206, at 296.
212 David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 64
(2008).
213 Cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony About
Differential Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under—and Over—Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 391, 406
(2004) (stating that with regard to general causation, “an opinion [based on differential
etiology] seems to be at most an educated guess”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 39 14-NOV-13 8:23
2013] judicial  resistance  to  the D A U B E R T  revolution 65
the substance at issue can cause the disease at issue,214 the court should not
have admitted Smith’s evidence here.
The Milward court seems to have been led astray in part by the plaintiff’s
expert on scientific methodology, philosophy professor Carl Cranor.215  Why
the court thought Cranor’s testimony—which the district court studiously
ignored in its opinion—so valuable is not obvious.  Cranor is not a scientist,
and he has been criticized for exhibiting confusion regarding basic scientific
concepts and their relationship to legal burdens of proof.216  Nor could Cra-
nor be expected to present a balanced view of how scientists approach causa-
tion; rather, Cranor is a long-time partisan of liberal admissibility rules for
plaintiffs’ evidence in toxic tort litigation, and an opponent of the stricter
rules that have come into place since Daubert.217  In his books, Cranor con-
sistently ignores the fundamental problem of adversarial bias addressed by
Rule 702 and the Daubert trilogy.
The value of Cranor’s testimony, if any, would be in helping the court
understand how scientists would approach the reliability test established by
amended Rule 702.  Yet in his deposition Cranor refused to opine on reliabil-
ity, claiming, “I don’t know what the word ‘reliability’ is” and “I don’t like the
word ‘reliable,’ because I don’t understand what it means.”218
Exactly how influential Milward will be remains to be seen.  When the
case reached the First Circuit, it had the unusual procedural posture of gen-
eral causation only being at issue.  The case is now back in the district court,
214 See Craig T. Smith, Peering into the Microscope: The Rise of Judicial Gatekeeping After
Daubert and Its Effect on Federal Toxic Tort Litigation, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 218, 225
(2007).
215 Cf. Schachtman, supra note 161 (“The [p]anel appeared to have been misled by
Carl F. Cranor, who described ‘inference to the best explanation’ as requiring a scientist to
‘consider all of the relevant evidence’ and ‘integrate the evidence using professional judg-
ment to come to a conclusion about the best explanation.  The available explanations are
then weighed, and a would-be expert witness is free to embrace the one he feels offers the
‘best’ explanation.  The appellate court’s opinion takes WOE, combined with Cranor’s
‘inference to the best explanation,’ to hold that an expert witness need only opine that he
has considered the range of plausible explanations for the association, and that he believes
that the causal explanation is the best or ‘most plausible.’  What is missing of course is the
realization that plausible does not mean established, reasonably certain, or even more
likely than not.  The Circuit’s invocation of plausibility also obscures the indeterminacy of
the available data for supporting a reliable conclusion of causation in many cases.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
216 See Michael D. Green, Science Is to Law as the Burden of Proof Is to Significance Testing,
37 JURIMETRICS 205, 221 (1997) (reviewing CRANOR, REGULATING, supra note 3) (noting R
Cranor’s “confusion of statistical significance and legal burdens of proof” and calling it “a
fundamental error”).
217 See, e.g., CRANOR, REGULATING, supra note 3, at 81–82; CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS, supra
note 3, at 367; Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-
Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1996).
218 Deposition of Carl F. Cranor, Milward v. Acuity Special Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d
11, 19 (1st Cir. 2011) (on file with author).
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where the parties are battling over the admissibility of specific causation testi-
mony, i.e., whether there is reliable evidence that Milward’s exposure to ben-
zene caused his disease, as opposed to whether benzene generally increases
the risk.219  It would hardly be surprising if the district court, which found
even the general causation testimony unreliable, were to exclude the even
more speculative specific causation evidence.  If the First Circuit were to
uphold such a ruling, the original Milward opinion would no longer seem so
significant.  If the First Circuit were to reverse such a ruling, it might very well
invite Supreme Court intervention.220
CONCLUSION
By academic convention, the author is expected at this point to propose
a grand theory.  In this instance,  the author might provide a theory of why
and when judges are inclined to defy statutes and Supreme Court prece-
dent.221  And yet, no grand theory is needed to explain the reaction of
judges to Daubert and its progeny.  The factors leading to judicial noncompli-
ance are straightforward.
First, the modern reliability test represents a radical change in the law of
expert testimony, and judges, a conservative lot,222 tend to be hostile to radi-
cal legal change.  Rule 702 not only codifies revolutionary changes in the
substantive law, but also places substantial new demands on judges by requir-
ing a far more managerial role for judges than they are used to assuming in
the American adversarial system.223  Judicial conservatism is enabled in part
by the conservatism of defense attorneys, who often themselves ignore the
219 See generally Bernstein, supra note 212 (explaining the difference between general
and specific causation).
220 An important common element of the three cases in the Daubert trilogy is that in
each case, the plaintiff’s expert causation evidence was notably weak.  The Court seems to
have chosen to take these particular cases because it was so easy in each of them to discern
the need for stricter rules than the lower courts had been willing to apply. See Faigman,
supra note 16, at 134. R
221 Perhaps judges’ willingness or unwillingness to strictly scrutinize expert testimony
tracks their general view of judge/jury responsibilities.  If so, a judge who, for example, is
more willing to grant motions for judgment as a matter of law based on the insufficiency of
the evidence will also be more likely to grant Daubert motions.  This seems like an empiri-
cally testable hypothesis worth pursuing.  The author thanks Prof. Michael Green of Wake
Forest Law School for the suggestion.
222 See Michael F. Duggan, The Law as Justification: A Critical Rationalist Analysis, 86 N.D.
L. REV. 149, 160 n.28 (2010) (“The judiciary is temperamentally the most conservative
branch of government . . . .”).
223 See Faigman, supra note 16, at 129 (suggesting that the managerial aspect of Daubert R
is perhaps its most radical feature); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or
Usurpers?  Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invad-
ing the Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV.
1, 5 (2000) (discussing judges’ case management responsibilities under Daubert).
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text of Rule 702 in their briefs in favor of reliance on old circuit precedents,
which invite judges to do the same.224
Moreover, judges and lawyers have been subject to a vast amount of liter-
ature on Daubert, which, as noted earlier in this Article,225 had significant
ambiguities.  The stricter Joiner and Kumho Tire opinions received substan-
tially less attention.  The especially forthright amended Rule 702, which as
the governing statute should be the focus of judicial attention when consider-
ing the admissibility of expert testimony, has received even less publicity.226
Because of these disparities, some judges seem not to realize that
Rule 702 was amended in 2000.227  Even among the majority who are cogni-
zant of the amendment, many judges seem to believe that Rule 702 simply
codified prior case law, without recognizing (a) that the language of Rule 702
precludes certain lenient interpretations of the Daubert trilogy, especially the
“methodologies only” and “the rules have a bias favoring admissibility of
expert testimony” interpretations of the Daubert opinion; and (b) that the
trilogy and the language of Rule 702 implicitly overruled a great deal of prior
case law, including, for example, any cases that applied Ferebee-like standards
to admissibility rulings.
Meanwhile, the organized plaintiffs’ bar has undertaken a well-funded
campaign to undermine the Daubert revolution by encouraging courts to
apply liberal standards to the admissibility of expert testimony.  Much of this
campaign was funded by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Pol-
icy (SKAPP), which sponsored conferences,228 policy papers,229 and law
review articles.230  SKAPP’s funding, ironically, came from money paid by
defendants into the Common Benefit Trust, part of the breast implant litiga-
224 For example, one main brief and three amicus briefs were filed in the Supreme
Court in support of the Court granting certiorari in Milward.  Only one of those briefs
discussed whether Milward was consistent with the language of Rule 702.  This author has
read many briefs asking judges to exclude expert testimony, and has noted that they often
neglect the text of Rule 702.
225 See supra notes 94–109 and accompanying text. R
226 Note that the title of this Article references Daubert, not Rule 702, because most
attorneys, judges, and law professors still think of the changes to expert evidence law as
being a result of Daubert.  This is despite two subsequent major Supreme Court rulings and
the amendment to Rule 702.
227 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. R
228 See David Michaels & Neil Vidmar, Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009,
at iii, iv (“SKAPP has convened four Coronado Conferences.  At each one a group of distin-
guished scientists, philosophers of science, judges, and policy experts presented papers
and discussed issues at the intersection of science, law, and public policy.”).
229 See, e.g., DAVID M. FLORES ET. AL., EFFECTS OF Daubert on Expert Evidence Practices
in Federal District Court of South Carolina 2 (2008); Scientific Knowledge & Pub. Policy,
Daubert: The Most Influential Supreme Court Ruling you’ve Never Heard of (2003).
230 See, e.g., David S. Caudill & Donald E. Curley, Strategic Idealizations of Science to Oppose
Environmental Regulation: A Case Study of Five TMDL Controversies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 251,
251–54 (2009), David Michaels, Foreword: Sarbanes-Oxley for Science, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 2006, at 1, 3 (noting this issue includes papers presented at Sequestered Science: The
Consequences of Undisclosed Knowledge, a symposium convened by SKAPP).
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tion settlement, which was itself the product of highly speculative, unreliable
expert testimony enabled by lenient judges.231  More recently, the Robert L.
Habush Foundation, affiliated with the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ group the Ameri-
can Association for Justice, provided funding to the Center for Public Repre-
sentation to sponsor a conference on Milward.232
The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ campaign has benefited from a number of intel-
lectual allies.  A particularly important one was the late Professor Margaret
Berger, author of the section of the influential Federal Judicial Center Refer-
ence Manual on Scientific Evidence dealing with the admissibility of expert testi-
mony.  Professor Berger expressed her increasing discomfort with the effects
of Daubert and its progeny on toxic tort litigation in several articles.233  Her
introductory essay in the third edition of the Reference Manual neglects Rule
702 without explanation, and claims, as if Joiner never existed, that Daubert
expresses a preference for admissibility.234
Finally, at least since Vice President Dan Quayle’s Council on Competi-
tiveness’s adoption of courtroom “junk science” as a pet issue,235 there has
been an undercurrent of concern among some judges that stricter standards
for the admissibility of expert testimony reflect a “right-wing” agenda that
they don’t share.  Yet concern that courts should ensure that expert testi-
mony relied upon by courts is reliable has long transcended ideological
boundaries.
Some of the earliest calls for a crackdown on dubious expert testimony
in toxic torts cases came from publications that typically take a liberal edito-
rial line, such as the New York Times and the New England Journal of
Medicine.236  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s opinions on expert testimony
231 See Bernstein, supra note 41; supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. R
232 See 2012 Spring Symposium, WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y, http://lawpolicyjournal.law.
wfu.edu/symposium/previousevent/2012-spring-symposium (last accessed Oct. 22, 2013).
Of course, defense interests have meanwhile been advocating for strict standards for the
admissibility of expert testimony.  However, my strong impression, as someone who has
been actively involved in these issues for many years, is that after their victories in the
Daubert trilogy and the amendment to Rule 702, defense interests that had been concerned
about expert testimony have mostly declared victory and went on to other things, while the
plaintiffs’ bar has been much more active in trying to encourage courts to apply liberal
rules.
233 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 118, at 287; Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade
of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT I) S59, S59–61 (2005); Margaret
A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 325–26
(2001).
234 See Berger, supra note 180, at 18.  As we have seen, Daubert itself is highly ambiguous
on the matter, see supra notes 81–92 and accompanying text, but after Joiner this claim is R
clearly false.
235 See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA (1991), as reprinted in 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979 (1992).
236 See supra notes 63, 95. R
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have been notably bipartisan and transideological,237 even while the Court
has been bitterly divided on other issues.  The Advisory Committee on fed-
eral rules that enacted the 2000 amendments to Rule 702 was a mainstream
body with no hint of a right-wing ideological agenda.  Finally, the political
left has traditionally had a great interest in protecting the rights of criminal
defendants from prosecutorial overreach, and the post-Daubert upheaval in
expert evidence law has helped prompt a broad reconsideration of dubious
forensic testimony used by prosecutors.238
The Supreme Court could step in at any time to reign in wayward cir-
cuits.  But for unknown reasons, the Court has allowed lower court judges
significant latitude to ignore Rule 702.239  The Court should intervene, not
just because lower courts are defying Rule 702, but because Rule 702 is sub-
stantively correct.
The use of adversarial expert testimony inherently invites adversarial
bias, which leads to experts testifying for each side presenting diametrically
opposing views to lay jurors.  Jurors have at least a fighting chance to reach
an accurate result when an expert is peddling obvious junk science that can
be rebutted with references to the extant contrary scientific literature.
The greater problem arises in a context where judges, since at least Fer-
ebee, have been most reluctant to exercise their gatekeeping responsibilities:
when a case involves issues on the frontier of scientific knowledge.  When
confronted with a “battle of the experts” with each expert claiming that his
scientific judgment either does or does not support a finding of causation, lay
jurors have no means by which they can determine whose judgment is supe-
rior.  The most effective solution to this conundrum would be the appoint-
ment of nonpartisan experts who are not subject to adversarial bias,240 but
this reform has been proposed for well over one hundred years and has yet to
make meaningful headway.241  The best alternative is to exclude expert
237 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens declined to join the full Daubert
opinion, and only Justice Stevens dissented in Joiner and Kumho Tire.
238 See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2009);
D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?—Daubert, the NAS Report, and the Notion of Error in Foren-
sic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519, 519–20, 527 (2010); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J.
Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (2005).
239 Indeed, the Supreme Court has inadvertently provided dicta in another context that
lower courts are using to evade their gatekeeping responsibilities. See Nathan A.
Schachtman, Matrixx Unloaded, SCHACHTMANLAW.COM (Mar. 29, 2011, 5:39 AM), http://
schachtmanlaw.com/matrixx-unloaded.
240 See Bernstein, supra note 35, at 459. R
241 See Sanders, supra note 56, at 77 (“[P]roposals [for greater use of nonpartisan R
experts] are resisted [by the legal establishment because] adversarial proce[sses constitute]
far more than a legal technique and instead encompass an entire political image of justice.
In light of this ideology, substantial movements away from party-witness experts seems
unlikely.” (footnote omitted)).
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testimony when experts cannot point to objective support for their conclu-
sions, and instead intend to ask the trier of fact to trust their unconfirmed
judgment.  And that is precisely what Rule 702 accomplishes.
